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Litigation Rulemaking
A B 5 T RAC T. Agencies and courts have generally been understood to relate in two primary ways.
First, judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act is the cornerstone
of the agency-court relationship. Second, and more recently, scholars have identified how agencies
act as litigation gatekeepers, influencing which suits may proceed in federal court. But we have yet
to recognize a third critical and emerging relationship between agencies and courts: agencies act-
ing as litigation rulemakers.
As litigation rulemakers, agencies implicitly amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
shape how litigation proceeds in federal court. Agencies have engaged in notice-and-comment
rulemaking restricting the availability of binding arbitration, adjudicated cases to require courts to
grant class relief, and issued guidance limiting the confidentiality of settlement agreements.
Whether through notice-and-comment rulemaking, adjudication, guidance, or other actions,
agencies are directing judges as to how they should address cases that appear before them. In so
doing, agencies are ffectively modifying the default procedural regime set forth by the Federal
Rules.
Understanding litigation rulemaking deepens our awareness of how the Federal Rules are
shaped and put into practice in the federal courts. The legitimacy of litigation rulemaking is bol-
stered by its similarities to the Rules Enabling Act process for amending the Rules, and the two
processes often complement each other. In many ways, litigation rulemaking illuminates the com-
plexity of the relationship between agencies and courts. Agencies acting as litigation rulemakers
often impose additional constraints on the courts, and when courts respond to these agency ac-
tions, a novel institutional dialectic arises. Notably, by effectively amending the procedural regime
that governs federal litigation, agencies are also shaping substantive law.
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At mid-century, Charles Clark, one of the primary drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, articulated the need for a regular reexamination and
revival of procedural law: "Unless revivified, the modern new procedure will
soon become as hard and unyielding as the old systems to which reform was
directed. Such, after all, is the nature of red tape, which procedure is and which
all orderly conduct of human activities must be."2 Quoting an earlier historian of
the law, Clark compared the "'inveterate nature of the incongruity between pro-
cedure and substantive law,' for 'the former petrifies while the latter is in its bud-
ding growth,' and 'the conservatism of the lawyer preserves the incongruity.'"
Indeed, the law of civil procedure calls for constant revision. Over the past
half-century, the growth of the federal docket,4 the rise of alternative forms of
dispute resolution,5 and the advent of the administrative state6 have all contrib-
uted to dramatic changes in the landscape of litigation. Today, heeding Clark's
call, administrative agencies are newly revivifying procedural law. By tailoring
the rules of civil procedure to different areas of substantive law, agencies are ef-
fectively amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ensuring that they do
not become "hard and unyielding." This Note describes these agency actions and
how they compare to the traditional approach to procedural lawmaking.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I begins by reviewing the established
process of drafting and amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as set out
in the Rules Enabling Act. A closer look at this process illuminates how federal
courts have established their procedural regime in the past and foreshadows the
similarities between the existing rulemaking process and the new, agency-led
approach.
Part II outlines the different relationships between administrative agencies
and federal courts. The two primary ways in which agencies relate to federal
1. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 961 (1987).
2. Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3
VAND. L. REV. 493, 507 (1950).
3. Id. (quoting CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTO1UCAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMERICA AND ENGLAND 31, 37 (1897)).
4. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 396 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin &
Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1859
(2014).
5. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124YALE L.J. 2804, 2806-14 (2015).
6. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelega-
tion Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 422, 425-27 (2008).
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courts are (1) through the review of agency action by federal courts and (2)
through agencies functioning as litigation gatekeepers for private enforcement
suits brought in federal courts. This Note introduces an emerging, third rela-
tionship between agencies and federal courts: agencies acting as litigation rule-
makers. As litigation rulemakers, agencies are taking actions that effectively
amend the Federal Rules and are thereby setting the procedural boundaries for
claims brought in federal court.
Agencies acting as litigation rulemakers are shaping court procedures at both
the front and back end of litigation. Part III details examples of litigation rule-
making at the front end of federal litigation, where agencies are deciding what
kinds of claims can proceed in federal court and what forms these claims can
take. For instance, through notice-and-comment rulemaking, some agencies
have required that certain claims be adjudicated in federal court. In another case,
an agency has decided that class waivers of arbitration are not permitted. Part IV
examines how agencies have ngaged in litigation rulemaking at the back end of
federal litigation, where agencies are shaping the kinds of relief available to par-
ties litigating disputes in federal court. For example, a few agencies have limited
the confidentiality of court orders and settlement agreements through guidance
that urges parties to disclose certain information to federal agencies. Another
agency has ordered the disclosure of information relating to class action settle-
ments. These examples illustrate how agencies are able to play a role in writing
the procedural rules at each stage of federal litigation.
Finally, Part V compares the conventional court rulemaking process with lit-
igation rulemaking and investigates its benefits and drawbacks. The benefits in-
clude the ability of agencies to use their expertise to fashion procedural rules
appropriate for each regulatory regime, the capacity of agencies to engage in pol-
ycentric problem solving, and the ability of agencies to tailor procedural regimes
to make them more coherent with particular substantive aims. The drawbacks
include the potential for outside influence and agency capture to affect litigation
rulemaking and the decline of transsubstantive procedural law. On net, the ben-
efits likely outweigh the costs. But court rulemaking has not receded into the
past; rather, agencies are now joining forces with the courts in reshaping the
Federal Rules. As a result, litigation rulemaking and court rulemaking can and
should complement each other. The Note concludes with a discussion of what
the advent of agency-led litigation rulemaking means for federal litigation and
for the relationship between administrative agencies and federal courts generally.
The agency actions discussed in this Note are important not only because
they are each individually significant- and in many cases, the subject of active,
high-profile litigation and debate - but also because they illuminate the capacity
of agencies to regulate courts and the litigation that takes place within the court-




demonstrates how courts are being constrained in a heretofore unrecognized
way. In addition, when federal courts respond to litigation rulemaking through
judicial review of agency action, a novel dialectic arises. This dialectic between
agencies and courts raises new questions about the legitimacy of litigation rule-
making, the scope of judicial review, and the role of Congress in overseeing this
agency-court relationship.
On balance, I conclude that this kind of agency action not only abides by
traditional separation-of-powers boundaries but is also desirable. In Clark's
words, litigation rulemaking promotes congruity between procedural and sub-
stantive law. In combination with court rulemaking, litigation rulemaking not
only helps ensure that the Federal Rules are "revivified," but also enhances the
democratic legitimacy of the overall project.
I. COURT RULEMAKING
Historically, the task of drafting the rules of procedure for federal litigation
has been assigned to the federal courts themselves. In the Rules Enabling Act of
1934, Congress authorized the federal courts to set their own rules of practice,
procedure, and evidence, subject to Congress's ability to reject, modify, or defer
any of the rules.7 Pursuant to the Act, the federal courts coordinate the task of
rulemaking through the Judicial Conference of the United States and its Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, typically referred to as the Standing
Committee.' The Standing Committee regularly reviews recommendations
from its five advisory committees and proposes changes to the rules to the Judi-
cial Conference as "necessary to maintain consistency and otherwise promote the
interest of justice."9 The different advisory committees that propose changes are
comprised of federal judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, state judges, and
representatives from the Department of Justice.o
7. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (describing the federal
courts' obligation to "carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general
rules of practice and procedure"); David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 927, 931-33 (describing the various
forms of the rules committees over the twentieth century); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen
Staszewski, The Supreme Court's Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law,
59 UCLAL. REv. 1188, 1198-1202 (2012).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 207 3(b) (2012).
9. Id.
10. See James C. Duff, Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public: The Federal Rules of Practice and
Procedure, U.S. COURTs, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process
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One of the advisory committees focuses on drafting and amending the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. As initially drafted, the Rules were meant to com-
prise a transsubstantive procedural regime for federal courts, collapsing distinc-
tions between law and equity and granting judges greater discretion to shape
courtroom proceedings." I refer to the Rules Enabling Act process for drafting
and amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as court rulemaking.
Today, the court rulemaking process involves at least seven stages of com-
ment and review and typically takes two to three years from start to finish. Any-
one can begin the process of drafting or amending a Rule by proposing a sug-
gestion to the Standing Committee, which will refer the proposal to the relevant
advisory committee. The advisory committee will decide whether to accept, de-
fer, or reject the suggestion. If accepted, the suggestion will be drafted as an
amendment and published for public comment. The advisory committee will
then consider the public comments and send a report to the Standing Committee
with its final recommendations. If the Standing Committee approves the pro-
posed rule change, it will send its recommendation to the Judicial Conference
along with its own report. The Judicial Conference will then consider proposed
amendments at its annual September meeting, and if approved, the amendments
will be transmitted to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court approves the
rules, it must then send the proposed amendments to Congress. If Congress does
not enact legislation within seven months to reject, modify, or defer the rules,
the rules take effect as law on December 1 of that year.12
Federal courts also reformulate the procedural rules for litigation through
judicial decisions that interpret the scope of the Rules." For instance, as Stephen
Burbank and Sean Farhang describe, the Supreme Court's decisions on pleading
requirements have brought about "momentous civil litigation reform that would
be impossible to secure from the legislature or its delegated procedural lawmak-
ing bodies."14 Although this Note largely focuses on comparing the Rules Com-
mittee-led court rulemaking process to the novel practice of agency-led litigation
/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-and-pubic [http://perma.cc/CPYS
-H59J].
n1. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, So NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 601 (2005).
12. See Duff, supra note lo.
13. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1543, 1603-12 (2014).
14. Id. at 1605-o6 ("Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal are a few recent examples of the Court using
its Article III judicial power to achieve results that would have been very difficult or impossible
to achieve through the exercise of delegated legislative lawmaking power under the Enabling
Act."). Many commentators have observed that the Court was implicitly amending the Federal




rulemaking, it is important to keep in mind that the courts also reshape the Fed-
eral Rules through adjudicative decisions.
But the federal courts are no longer the sole authors of the rules that govern
the litigation that takes place within their doors. In recent years, federal admin-
istrative agencies have merged as central figures in changing these rules. As the
following Part explains, this function of federal agencies departs from existing
accounts of the role of administrative agencies in federal litigation.
II. AGENCIES AND COURTS
The relationship between agencies and courts takes many forms. Most fun-
damentally, courts exercise judicial review over agency action to ensure that
agencies act within their statutory authority. Agencies, in turn, regulate the liti-
gation that proceeds in federal courts through litigation gatekeeping, deciding
which private suits even make it to federal court. This Note identifies a third
relationship between federal agencies and federal courts: litigation rulemaking.
As litigation rulemakers, agencies regulate the shape and structure of the litiga-
tion that takes place in federal courts, effectively amending the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Although agencies have ngaged in litigation rulemaking in a
wide range of substantive areas, this function of agencies has yet to be identified
or understood.
First, federal agency action is almost always reviewable by federal courts.
Under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), " [a] person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof."" This language creates the strong presumption in favor of the
reviewability of agency action, and judicial review is often sought in order to
ensure that agencies are acting pursuant to their statutory authority.16 The sub-
jects of agency action can also seek judicial review to ensure agencies respect the
the Future of Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1189, 1191 (2010) ("In Twombly and
Iqbal, by contrast, the Court ignored the requirements of the Enabling Act and its own prior
decisions on the difference between judicial interpretation and judicial amendment."); Arthur
R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 6o DuKE L.J. 1, 84-89 (2010) (explaining how the "legislative-like decisions in Twombly
and Iqbal ... have caused many to question the continuing role of the rulemaking process and
its current statutory structure"). Whether the Court's actions in these cases were permissible
amendments of the Federal Rules is a distinct debate and outside of the scope of this Note.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). Section 701(a) of the APA contains two exceptions to this right of re-
view: section 702 judicial review is not available if the "statute[] preclude[s] judicial review"
or if the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 477 (1987).
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due process rights of regulated parties." But the scope and breadth of judicial
review of agency action remains hotly contested. Recent years have witnessed
the revival of debates about the appropriate level of judicial deference to agency
decision making and the extent to which the legislature and judiciary should su-
pervise agency action. " Nevertheless, judicial review remains the cornerstone of
the agency-court relationship.
Second, many agencies act as litigation gatekeepers for suits brought in fed-
eral courts." As litigation gatekeepers, certain agencies exercise their power to
oversee, coordinate, permit, and prohibit private litigation. This includes deter-
mining whether a private right of action should lie in a particular context20 and
evaluating private lawsuits on a case-by-case basis to decide whether the suits
should proceed.2 1 According to David Freeman Engstrom, litigation gatekeeping
can be categorized along five primary dimensions:22
(1) An agency has affirmative authority if it directly controls private en-
forcement efforts and residual authority if the agency influences private
enforcement by exercising its procedural rights - for example, its right to
intervene in cases as an interested party.23
(2) An agency engages in retail gatekeeping if it exercises case-by-case
oversight of private enforcement or wholesale gatekeeping if the agency
instead creates private rights of action across the board.24
(3) An agency's decision to permit or prohibit private suits from proceed-
ing in court may be either legally binding or merely advisory.25
1. See id.
is. See generally id.
ig. See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013).
20. See id. at 619 & n-4.
21. See id. at 619-20, 620 n.5. Many commentators have called for agencies to have even more
expansive "gatekeeping" authority in different domains. See id. at 620 n.6 (listing scholars
who have called for greater agency involvement in litigation).
22. See id. at 644.
23. See id. at 647.
24. See id. at 647-48.




(4) An agency may be authorized to exercise its gatekeeping authority
passively- by expressing its view as to whether a private enforcement ac-
tion should proceed2 6 - or actively - by taking control of the private en-
forcement action or displacing it with a public enforcement proceeding
of its own.2 7
(5) An agency can exercise either veto authority, meaning that private
suits proceed unless the agency holds otherwise, or license authority,
meaning that private suits require agency approval in order to go for-
ward.28
Each of these binaries describes how agencies make decisions about whether
private enforcement actions can proceed in federal court and when public en-
forcement should step in and supplant private litigation.
In addition to judicial review and litigation gatekeeping, agencies and courts
relate in yet a third way: agencies determine not only whether litigation can take
place in federal courts but how the litigation will unfold. In this role, agencies act
not as litigation gatekeepers but instead as litigation rulemakers. As litigation rule-
makers, agencies establish the terms on which litigation will proceed, laying out
the procedural rules that will govern particular sets of claims. That is, agencies
effectively amend the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outside of the
traditional Rules Enabling Act process. This is different from litigation gate-
keeping, as explained by Engstrom, which does not capture agencies implicitly
amending the rules by which civil litigation takes place in federal courtrooms.
Litigation rulemaking is a distinctive agency function: agencies are not regulat-
ing whether private litigation proceeds or whether public litigation takes its
place, but rather, the requirements for private litigation as it takes place in federal
courts.2 9
In the discussion that follows, I refer to the procedural regime set forth in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as encompassing not just the text of the
Rules but also the case law that tells courts how the Rules should be applied. For
26. For instance, in a False Claims Act case, the Department of Justice may move to dismiss or
settle a case out from under a private plaintiff-relator, subject only to a basic fairness hearing,
by registering its view with the court and requesting dismissal. See id. at 65o.
27. See id. at 650-54.
28. See id. at 654-55.
29. Not all litigation rulemakers are litigation gatekeepers. As discussed in Part V, an agency's
ability to engage in litigation rulemaking is rooted in its statutory authority. An agency (or
court) could interpret its statutory mandate to allow the agency to modify the rules of civil
litigation for a particular kind of suit (litigation rulemaking) but not to permit the agency to
block suits from proceeding in court (litigation gatekeeping).
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instance, under Rule 12(b)(6), a court can dismiss a complaint for its failure to
state a claim.30 But the Rule cannot be applied without looking to the relevant
case law - specifically, the plausibility-pleading requirements established in Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly3 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.32 In other contexts (most prominently,
arbitration), the relevant jurisprudence is not just federal courts' interpretations
of the Rules but also their interpretations of related statutes, such as the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), that affect how courts apply the Rules. To take just one
example, the Federal Rules regime includes not just the text and case law on Rule
12 (under which motions to compel arbitration are typically brought) but also
the FAA case law that dictates how courts must apply Rule 12 given an arbitration
agreement.3 3 Just as Twombly/1qbal and Rule 12(b)(6) are inextricably bound to-
gether, the FAA and Rule 12(b) defenses are intertwined as part and parcel of the
Federal Rules regime.
The subsequent Parts describe examples of agencies engaging in litigation
rulemaking in different forms -through notice-and-comment rulemaking, ad-
judication, guidance, and agency-specific orders. Each action can be understood
not merely as a standard agency action34 but also as an implicit amendment o
the existing procedural regime set forth in the Federal Rules. I focus on a few
specific examples in order to demonstrate how agencies have ngaged in litiga-
tion rulemaking in a manner distinct from litigation gatekeeping. Although I
provide examples from a range of legal contexts, I do not canvass all instances of
agency-led litigation rulemaking. Rather, the aim here is to document a discern-
ible - and critical - pattern of agency action and to understand it in the context
of the established court rulemaking process.
To illustrate how agencies are transforming litigation in federal courts today,
the agency actions described in the following two Parts are divided by the stage
of litigation that they impact. These examples demonstrate how agencies can
play a role at any of the various phases of a lawsuit brought in federal court. In
the process, I explain how litigation rulemaking can take different forms - no-
tice-and-comment, guidance, adjudication, and other orders - and the implica-
tions of an agency choosing one form over the other. Through each of these ac-
tions, agencies engaging in litigation rulemaking are regulating courts' exercise
of their judicial power.
30. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
31. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
32. 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see sources cited supra note 14 (noting that the Court has implicitly
amended the Federal Rules through Iqbal and Twombly).
33. See infra Section III.A.
34. Because agencies that act as litigation rulemakers do so through an established form of agency
action, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, these agency actions are typically subject to




III. AGENCIES AT THE FRONT END
I begin with examples of litigation rulemaking in which agencies have re-
written the procedural rules governing cases that have just been filed in court.
For instance, agencies are using notice-and-comment rulemaking to limit the
availability of binding arbitration. At least one agency has also restored the right
to class relief through a series of adjudications and a policy of nonacquiescence
with adverse federal court decisions. Both examples illustrate how agencies are
playing an increasingly salient role in determining the form that cases take in
federal court - deciding which kinds of claims will be subject to binding arbitra-
tion and which cases, once filed, will continue to be adjudicated in front of fed-
eral judges.
A. Binding Arbitration Clauses
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to abolish common law rules that made it dif-
ficult to obtain specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate and to align
federal court practice with state practices that specifically enforced agreements
to arbitrate." The FAA "lay somewhat dormant"36 until the 198os, when, in a
series of decisions, the Court began to read the statute to embody a federal pre-
sumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements." Since then, the Court
has held that the FAA preempts state law" and governs agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims" as well. According to the Court, arbitration involves "lower
costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators
to resolve specialized disputes."40 As this line of case law developed, companies
and private parties across all sectors of the economy began adding arbitration
clauses to a wide range of agreements with individual consumers and other par-
ties.41 Today, arbitration clauses are commonly found in all sorts of contracts,
35. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of
Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 59 (2015).
36. Id.
37. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
38. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984).
39. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than ajudicial, forum.").
40. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
41. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 35, at 59; Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg.
33,210, 33,215-16 (July 19, 2017).
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and the Supreme Court has formulated a policy of upholding arbitration agree-
ments in essentially all cases.42
But not all agencies have followed the Court's lead. Pointing to the draw-
backs of binding arbitration, several agencies have pushed back by issuing rules
limiting the availability of binding arbitration. Acting through the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process, these agencies have justified their actions as con-
gressionally authorized. As discussed below, the Centers for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services (CMS) has based its rule banning binding arbitration on its general
statutory mandate to promote public health and safety. In response to even more
specific statutory instructions, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) has curtailed the availability of arbitration in consumer contracts.
Through notice-and-comment, these agencies are telling federal courts how to
act when faced with arbitration agreements. As a result, these agency actions are
a prime example of litigation rulemaking.
1. CMS Rule on Binding Arbitration
In October 2016, the CMS, which is an agency within the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), promulgated a final rule under the Social
Security Act that barred long-term care facilities (which include nursing homes)
from entering into binding predispute arbitration agreements with their resi-
dents.43 This rule applied to all long-term care facilities that received Medicare
and Medicaid funding, which encompassed almost all long-term care facilities in
42. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 2838-40. Of course, debates about the validity of arbitration agree-
ments have continued apace in the literature and in litigation. See, e.g., id. at 2810-11; Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y.
TIMEs (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/11/ol/business/dealbook/arbitration
-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [http://perma.cc/8A79-DC6Y] (quoting
Andrew Pincus, a lawyer who has represented companies using arbitration in several major
FAA cases before the Court, reflecting, "Arbitration provides a way for people to hold compa-
nies accountable without spending a lot of money. It's a system that can work.").
43. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facili-




the country4" and up to 1.5 million individuals.4 5 The agency cited several dis-
tinct provisions of the Social Security Act as statutory bases for the new rule.46
As initially proposed, the rule had focused on improving the disclosure and
transparency of predispute arbitration clauses without banning them.47 How-
ever, after receiving nearly o,ooo comments on the proposed rule,4 8 including
feedback from patient groups concerned about the widespread use of arbitra-
tion,4 9 the agency issued a final rule that banned binding predispute arbitration
clauses altogether.o The final rule also prohibited long-term care facilities from
44. See Rebecca Hersher, New Rule Preserves Patients' Rights To Sue Nursing Homes in Court, NPR
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2o16/o9/29/495918132/new
-rule-preserves-patients-rights-to-sue-nursing-homes-in-court [http://perma.cc/MS45
-UDWW].
45. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, U.S. Just Made It a Lot Less Difficult To Sue
Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/o9/29/business
/dealbook/arbitration-nursing-homes-elder-abuse-harassment-claims.html [http://perma
.cc/PAG3-RS3J] [hereinafter Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, U.S. just Made It a Lot Less Difficult
To Sue Nursing Homes]. The New York Times has reported on the effects of arbitration clauses
in cases where nursing home residents were unable to bring claims in court as a result of
having signed binding predispute arbitration clauses as a condition of admission into the
nursing home. For instance, in May 2014, a woman with Alzheimer's was sexually assaulted
twice in two days by other nursing home residents, according to an investigation by the state's
department of public health. Although the state's investigation found that the nursing home
had "failed to protect" the woman, the woman's family was unsuccessful in its attempt to have
the arbitration clause in its agreement voided. According to the Times, between 2010 and 2014,
more than one hundred cases against nursing homes for wrongful death, medical malpractice,
and elder abuse were forced into arbitration. See id.; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Cork-
ery, In Arbitration, a "Privatization of the Justice System," N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/o2/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of
-the-justice-system.html [http://perma.cc/8R87-HZVF].
46. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 68,791-93 (citing, interalia, §§ 1102(a) and 1871 of the Act, which authorize
the HHS Secretary "to issue such rules as may be necessary to the efficient administration of
the functions of the Department," § 1866, which "requires all Medicare providers and suppli-
ers to agree to certain conditions in order to participate in the Medicare program,"
§ 1902(a)(27), a similar provision for Medicaid providers, and §§ 1819 (d)( 4)(B) and
1919(d)( 4 )(B), which require long-term care facilities to "meet such other requirements re-
lating to the health, safety, and well-being of residents or relating to the physical facilities
thereof as the Secretary may find necessary" (footnote omitted)).
47. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 68,790. For instance, the proposed rule would have required facilities using
predispute arbitration clauses to provide in-depth explanations of the arbitration agreements
to the residents who were signing them. See id.
48. See Hersher, supra note 44.
49. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, U.S. Just Made It a Lot Less Difficult To Sue Nursing Homes, supra
note 45.
50. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 68,8oo.
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requiring residents to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of being al-
lowed to continue to stay at the facilities." In addition, the rule imposed a re-
quirement that when a long-term care facility and resident resolved a dispute
with arbitration, a copy of the signed agreement for binding arbitration and the
arbitrator's final decision had to be retained by the facility for five years and re-
main available for inspection upon request by the CMS. This provision allowed
arbitration proceedings to be kept confidential while enabling the agency to eval-
uate the role of arbitration in long-term elder care.52
The CMS's litigation rulemaking did not go uncontested. Soon after being
issued, the CMS rule was challenged in court, and a federal district judge issued
a preliminary injunction against the rule." The court held that the agency had
exceeded its statutory mandate to impose "requirements relating to the health
and safety [and the well-being] of the residents" with the rule.54 As discussed
below, the decision reflected the tensions inherent in an agency's regulation of
federal court proceedings. It also demonstrated the dialectic developing between
agencies and courts about the proper scope of federal civil litigation and the pro-
cedural rules that should govern it.
While the case was on appeal, the 2016 presidential election took place, re-
sulting in a change in the Administration and in the agency's direction. Conse-
quently, in early June 2017, the CMS voluntarily dismissed the appeal" and is-
sued a revised proposed rule removing the ban on arbitration agreements. The
new rule mandates only that binding arbitration agreements be in plain lan-
guage, that the agreements be clearly communicated to residents who are sign-
ing them, and that all signed arbitration agreements and final arbitration agree-
ments be kept on file for inspection by the CMS.5 6
Although the original arbitration rule was withdrawn after the election, the
rulemaking revealed how the agency could play a role in crafting the federal pro-
cedural regime. Other agencies have taken similar steps.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Am. Health Care Ass'n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 934-38 (N.D. Miss. 2016).
54. Id. at 937 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 13 9 5i- 3(d)( 4 )(B), 1396r(d)(4)(B)); see also id. at 939.
55. See Jeff Overley, CMS Abandons Nursing Home Arbitration Appeal, LAw360 (June 2, 2017),
http://www.law360.com/articles/930890/cms-abandons-nursing-home-arbitration-appeal
[http://perma.cc/2Q3C-GTQIK].
56. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revision of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facili-
ties: Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 26,649 (proposed June 8, 2017) (to be codified at




2. CFPB Rules on Binding Arbitration
While the CMS based its rulemaking on its general statutory mandate, in
other cases, Congress has expressly instructed administrative agencies to issue
rules governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements. In 2010, the Dodd-
Frank Act tasked the CFPB with studying the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements in consumer contracts and if necessary, issuing a rule to limit the use
of these agreements to protect consumers.7 In July 2017, the Bureau issued a
final rule prohibiting consumer financial providers from using binding arbitra-
tion clauses that waive consumers' rights to bring their claims collectively." The
rule was a response to the Bureau's findings that few consumers consider bring-
ing individual actions against financial service providers, either in court or in
arbitration, and that class actions provide a more effective method of securing
relief for unlawful practices by consumer financial companies."
The CFPB's new rule had two major components.60 First, the rule prohibited
consumer financial service providers from requiring consumers to sign binding
predispute arbitration clauses that would bar them from bringing class actions
with respect to financial products or services.61 Second, the rule required covered
providers that are involved in arbitration proceedings to submit certain records
to the Bureau, such as the size of arbitration awards. The purpose of this part of
the rule was to monitor arbitrations so that the Bureau could identify additional
consumer protection concerns warranting future agency action and could pub-
lish portions of these arbitral records in order to increase the transparency of the
process.62
The rule met immediate resistance. Within approximately three months,
both the House of Representatives and the Senate voted to overturn the rule, led
by Republican lawmakers who thought it impeded the interests of the financial
57. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1028(a), (b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2003-04 (2010).
58. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040. For a more comprehensive history of the rule, see Arbitration Agreements,
82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017). The widespread interest in the rule and the contentious
nature of the Bureau's rulemaking process was evidenced by the more than 110,000 comments
that the Bureau received between the publication of the proposed rule in May 2016 and the
issuance of the final rule in July 2017. See id. at 33,246.
59. See id. at 33,220-45.
6o. See id. at 33,210.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 33,210, 33,317.
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industry.63 Soon thereafter, President Trump signed the congressional resolution
striking down the rule.64 But even though the rule did not survive the shift in
political winds, it was a prime example of litigation rulemaking. The CFPB had
marshaled its resources and expertise to engage in comprehensive information-
gathering, followed by focused and informed rulemaking, in a way that fur-
thered Congress's consumer financial protection goals, pursuant to the Dodd-
Frank Act.
The CFPB rule was just one example of Congress responding to the rise of
arbitration by directing agencies to regulate it. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act
also amended the Truth in Lending Act to prohibit binding predispute arbitra-
tion in certain mortgage loans,6 5 and in early 2013, the CFPB promulgated final
rules to implement this statutory directive.6 6 Outside of the CFPB context, in
2004, Fannie Mae issued guidance prohibiting binding predispute arbitration
language in all mortgages that the agency purchases or guarantees in mortgage-
backed securities.67 And in 2007, Congress barred binding predispute arbitration
clauses in certain loans made to service members, a policy that was further im-
plemented through Department of Defense regulations broadening the range of
consumer products in which binding arbitration was banned.68 In 2008, Con-
63. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight To Allow More Class-Action Suits,
N.Y. TiMEs (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-vote-wall
-street-regulation.html [http://perma.cc/VZV5-F2HN].
64. See Sylvan Lane, Trump Repeals Consumer Arbitration Rule, Wins Banker Praise, HILL (Nov. 1,
2017, 4:43PM EST), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trump-repeals-consumer
-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking [http://perma.cc/2BVZ-ZEU71.
65. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1414, 124 Stat. 1376, 2149 (2010).
66. See Loan Originator Compensation Requirements Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regula-
tion Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 11,280, 11,281, 11,386-88 (Feb. 15, 2013).
67. See Kenneth R. Harney, Fannie Follows Freddie in Banning Mandatory Arbitration, WASH. POST
(Oct. 9, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18O52-2004Oct8.html
[http://perma.cc/GUS2-7QZV]; B8-3-o2: Special Note Provisions and Language Requirements,
FANNIE MAE (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/selling/b8/3/o2
.html [http://perma.cc/62H2-FWHR]. The guidance contains the caveat that mortgages
subject to mandatory arbitration are ineligible for sale to or securitization by Fannie Mae un-
less the provision provides that "in the event of a transfer or sale of the mortgage or an interest
in the mortgage to Fannie Mae, the mandatory arbitration clause immediately and automati-
cally becomes null and void and cannot be reinstated." Id.
68. See 1o U.S.C. § 987(e)(3), (f)( 4 ) (2012). In July 2015, the Department of Defense issued new
final rules that broadened the range of "consumer credit" products covered by the Military
Lending Act to better correspond to the range of products considered "consumer credit" under




gress amended agricultural law to require that livestock or poultry contracts con-
taining arbitration agreements disclose the right of the producer or grower to
decline the arbitration agreement,69 which was further implemented through
Department of Agriculture regulations in 2011.70
In other cases, Congress has granted agencies the statutory authority to en-
gage in litigation rulemaking to limit arbitration - encouraging them to do so -
but agencies have not exercised this authority. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act
authorized the SEC to issue rules to restrict arbitration agreements in contracts
between consumers and securities broker-dealers or investment advisers," but
the agency has not yet used this authority to constrain the use of arbitration, in
part due to fear of political blowback.72 Nevertheless, the CFPB's recent action
on consumer-oriented arbitration agreements is just one example of a broader
trend of agency-led litigation rulemaking relating to arbitration.
3. Litigation Rulemaking and Rule 12
These agency rules relating to the enforceability of arbitration agreements
implicitly amend Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To understand
how, consider how an agency action like the CMS rule affects a proceeding to
enforce an arbitration clause in federal court. When a party seeks to enforce an
agreement o arbitrate, the standard procedure is for the party to file a motion to
compel arbitration." Motions to compel arbitration are typically governed by
Members and Dependents, So Fed. Reg. 43,560, 43,560, 43,599 (July 22, 2015) (codified at 32
C.F.R. pt. 232).
69. 7 U.S.C. § 197c (2012).
70. See Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act of 2008; Suspension of Delivery of Birds, Additional Capital Investment Criteria,
Breach of Contract, and Arbitration, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,874, 76,874-890 (Dec. 9, 2011).
71. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1841, § 921(a)-(b) (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 780(0), Sob-5 (f)
(2012)). The Dodd-Frank Act also prohibited the use of arbitration agreements in connection
with certain whistleblower proceedings. See Dodd-Frank § 9 22(b) (2010) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (2012)).
72. See Editorial, Will Jay Clayton Protect Investors?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2017), http://www
.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/opinion/sunday/will-jay-clayton-protect-investors.html [http://
perma.cc/79FE-A77Z].
73. See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3569 (3d ed.),
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017). The FAA authorizes court proceedings for motions to
compel arbitration but does not specify the Federal Rule under which such a motion should
be brought. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). Because there is no Federal Rule that directly speaks to
how courts should address arbitration agreements, litigants and judges typically deal with
motions to compel arbitration within the framework of the existing Rules.
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Rule 12, which outlines seven defenses available to parties in response to a plain-
tiff's initial pleadings for relief, including lack of subject-matter jurisdiction un-
der Rule 12(b)(1), improper venue under Rule 12(b)( 3 ), and failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).7 Courts vary as to
which provision of Rule 12 a defendant should cite in bringing a motion to com-
pel arbitration. Some courts have held that a motion to compel arbitration
should be evaluated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion,75 while others consider motions
to compel arbitration to be 12 (b)( 3 )76 or 12(b)(6) motions.
77 Regardless of
which provision of Rule 12 a court references in evaluating a motion to compel
arbitration, however, the effect of the agency's litigation rulemaking is the same.
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). While certain courts permit litigants to bring these motions to com-
pel arbitration under different provisions of Rule 12(b), others set stricter rules, for instance,
forbidding district judges from considering motions to compel arbitration as Rule 12(b) (1)
motions. See City of Benkelman, Neb. v. Baseline Engineering Corp., 867 F.3d 875, 881 (8th
Cit. 2017).
75. See Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F-3d 303, 3o6 (5th Cit. 2014) (holding that a district court should
dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(1), when the dispute is
subject to binding arbitration); see also 5B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1350 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updatedApr. 2017) (" [T]here is authority
to the effect that other matters of defense, including a claim that the plaintiffs failure to arbi-
trate precludes the maintenance of an action in federal court, cannot properly be raised on a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Yet there is authority to the contrary
on the subject, particularly when the obligation to arbitrate is mandatory." (footnote omit-
ted)).
76. See Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 472, 1-3 ( 5 th Cit. 2010)
(stating that the Fifth Circuit has not "definitively decided whether Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule
12(b)( 3) is the proper rule for motions to dismiss based on an arbitration ... clause" and ex-
plaining that the Fifth Circuit has accepted Rule 12(b) (3) "as a proper method for dismissal").
77. See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 716 F.3d 764, 771-76 (3d Cir. 2013) (ex-
plaining that the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is appropriate when the "affirmative defense of ar-
bitrability of claims is apparent on the face of a complaint" and discovery is not necessary
(quoting Somerset Consulting, LLC v. United Capital Lenders, LLC, 832 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481
(E.D. Pa. 2011))); see also 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 73, § 3569 n.38.
A few courts have held that when further factual development is needed, the motion to
compel arbitration should be decided by applying the Rule 56 summary judgment standard.
However, these courts have concluded that there is little difference between applying the Rule
56 standard and the Rule 12(b) (6) standard, since judges evaluating motions to compel arbi-
tration typically consider evidence outside of the pleadings in either case. See City ofBenkel-
man, 867 F.3d at 881-82 (holding that a motion to compel arbitration can be analyzed under
either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56); Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 771-76; Tinder v. Pinkerton Security,
305 F.3d 728, 735 (7 th Cir. 2002) ("The FAA does not expressly identify the evidentiary stand-
ard a party seeking to avoid compelled arbitration must meet. But courts that have addressed
the question have analogized the standard to that required of a party opposing summary judg-




By issuing its rule on arbitration, the CMS directed federal courts to deny
motions to compel arbitration brought in the context of agreements between
nursing homes and elderly residents. In so doing, the agency effectively amended
Rule 12(b) to disallow a federal court from granting a motion to compel arbitra-
tion in certain cases. To be clear, the agency did not amend the types of defenses
that a defendant may assert under Rule 12(b), nor did it expressly change the
text of the Rule. Rather, the agency instructed the court as to how it must re-
spond to a motion to compel arbitration in the particular context of a contract
between a nursing home and an elderly resident. This kind of action exemplifies
litigation rulemaking.
One might argue that this agency action involves an interpretation of the
FAA, rather than an implicit amendment o the Federal Rules. But recall that the
FAA itself can be understood as a gloss on the Federal Rules. The FAA case law
establishes a norm that federal courts should almost always grant motions to
compel arbitration under Rule 12. By specifying the application of Rule 12 in the
context of arbitration, the FAA (and related case law) has effectively become part
of the Federal Rules regime. In the face of this regime, the CMS and CFPB rules
directed courts as to how they should respond to certain kinds of arbitration
agreements. These agencies acting as litigation rulemakers were self-avowedly
interpreting their own authorizing statutes, not the FAA.7
In fact, through the notice-and-comment process, these agencies effectively
pointed out contradictions between their own interpretations of their substan-
tive statutes and the federal courts' interpretations of the FAA. While the courts
have read the FAA to establish a pro-arbitration policy in all substantive areas of
law, these agencies have read other statutes -here, the Social Security Act and
the Dodd-Frank Act- as militating against arbitration. By publishing these anti-
arbitration rules in the Federal Register, the agencies told courts how to reconcile
these statutory commands. The agencies asserted the importance of congres-
sional interests that the courts - in the eyes of the agencies - had ignored.
A clash in the courts resulted. As the November 2016 CMS litigation re-
vealed, at least one court stood ready to question whether an agency could issue
a rule contradicting the courts' existing understanding of what to do when faced
with a motion to compel arbitration. Through the conflict that played out in the
briefing, argument, and eventual opinion, the judge and agency debated their
appropriate roles in setting the ground rules for federal civil litigation. This in-
terbranch dialogue was a natural consequence of litigation rulemaking. By tell-
ing judges how to apply the Rules to the cases before them, agencies are bound
78. In any event, it is not clear that the CMS or CFPB rulemaking could be considered a valid
interpretation or amendment of the FAA. Any agency's reading of the FAA as prohibiting
mandatory arbitration would depart so significantly from the judiciary's established interpre-
tation of the FAA that it likely would not be lawful.
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to come into conflict with the courts. The result is a vital debate about the insti-
tutions' relative roles in interpreting statutory intent and advancing the public
interest through procedural change.
The CMS and CFPB examples also raise important questions about the scope
of statutory authority. When litigation rulemaking takes places through notice-
and-comment, agencies may ground their actions in either broad or narrow stat-
utory mandates. For instance, the CMS justified its rulemaking on the basis of a
general statutory mandate in the Social Security Act. In contrast, the CFPB's rule
stemmed from a specific grant of rulemaking authority in the Dodd-Frank Act.
These two approaches have different implications for litigation rulemaking and
its perceived legitimacy. On the one hand, basing a rule on a general statutory
grant of authority may mean the rule is more susceptible to a court challenge,
since a court can more easily conclude that the agency's interpretation of the stat-
ute fell too far afield of congressional intent. This is what happened in the court
challenge to the CMS rule." On the other hand, allowing agencies to interpret
general statutory mandates to formulate specific rules through notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking affords agencies important flexibility. This flexibility permits
agencies to issue rules that may not have been expressly contemplated at the time
the statute was passed but that would have been considered necessary by the
Congress that wrote the statute in light of contemporary developments. For in-
stance, Congress may not have delegated to CMS the express authority to regu-
late binding arbitration agreements between ursing homes and their elderly
residents, simply because such agreements were not common when the Social
Security Act was written. Reasonable minds may differ on the legitimacy of
agency action in the absence of sufficiently express delegation.0 The point is
simply that notice-and-comment rulemaking brings the question of underlying
statutory authority to the fore.
Setting aside these arguments, the CMS and CFPB examples illustrate how
agencies have engaged in litigation rulemaking at the front end of litigation. And
despite subsequent shifts in political support for some of the arbitration rules,
these actions unveiled agencies' overall capacity to engage in litigation rulemak-
ing.
79. See Am. Health Care Ass'n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 934-38 (N.D. Miss. 2016).
so. The litigation and briefing in the court challenge to the CMS rule highlight the arguments on




B. Class Waivers in Arbitration Agreements
Litigation rulemaking has also reshaped the lawfulness of class action waiv-
ers in the context of arbitration agreements. Again, this is evidenced by the jux-
taposition between the Court's jurisprudence on class action waivers and an
agency's response to this case law.
In the past few decades, the Court has not only limited litigants' access to
judicial forums in cases involving arbitration but also the availability of class ac-
tions for parties to arbitration agreements. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp., for instance, the parties to an arbitration agreement had stip-
ulated that their contract was silent regarding the availability of class arbitra-
tion." The Court held that under the FAA, class arbitration was not permitted82
because "class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a de-
gree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to
submit their disputes to an arbitrator."" According to the Court, the parties were
required to specify a contractual basis for allowing class arbitration.84
The Court doubled down on this logic in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
holding that the enforcement of a class waiver in a standard form contract con-
taining an arbitration clause is lawful and not unconscionable under the FAA or
common-law contract principles." The Court asserted that "[r]equiring the
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of ar-
bitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA." 86 In American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,17 the Court reinforced this point, holding
that class waivers in arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA even
if the plaintiff's cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds
the potential recovery and arbitration is economically infeasible." Taken to-
gether, these cases embody a policy in favor of class arbitration waivers under
81. 559 U.S. 662, 668-69 (2010).
82. Id. at 684-87.
83. Id. at 685.
84. Id. at 682-84, 687.
85- 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
86. Id. at 344.
87. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013).
88. See id.
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the FAA.8 9 In the face of this case law, however, the NLRB has decided that col-
lective action is critical and issued a series of decisions preserving the right to
engage in class arbitration in the labor context.
1. NLRB Decisions on Class Waivers
In recent years, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has issued a
number of decisions that have barred employer-employee agreements contain-
ing clauses that waive employees' rights to bring class or collective actions. The
NLRB has held that sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) do not permit these waivers, even in the face of the Court's jurispru-
dence upholding arbitration and arbitral class waivers.9 0
In 2012, in D.R. Horton, Inc., the NLRB decided, in a 3-2 decision, that an
employer violated sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA when it required employees cov-
ered by the Act to sign an agreement hat precluded them from filing joint, class,
or collective claims against their employer in any arbitral or judicial forum.91
Specifically, the Board held that the agreement interfered with the section 7 right
of employees to "engage in . .. concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."92 The following year, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the Board's decision, holding that the arbitration agreement was
89. The Court has continued to reinforce its pro-arbitration policy in its most recent decisions on
the subject. In 2015, the Court upheld a class waiver in an arbitration clause under the FAA
and rejected a claim that the waiver could be invalidated by state law. See DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466, 471 (2015). In 2017, the Court again held that state law could
not stand in the way of enforcing an arbitration agreement. See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd.
P'ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1425-26, 1429 (2017).
go. Section 7 of the Act states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights" guaranteed in section
7 ofthe Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
91. See 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2277-82, 2288-89 (2012).




enforceable under the FAA and that the Board had no authority to ignore
longstanding FAA jurisprudence, even in light of its reading of the NLRA."
But the NLRB was undeterred. Just two years later, in Murphy Oil,94 it reaf-
firmed its initial holding in D.R. Horton. In so doing, the Board continued to
resist the federal courts' interpretation of the relationship between the FAA and
the NLRA and their interpretation of whether the "concerted activity" protected
by section 7 encompasses the ability to bring a class or collective action." The
Fifth Circuit reversed the Board's decision but refused to hold the Board in con-
tempt for its recalcitrance to follow the D.R. Horton holding. Instead, it reasoned
that because the "Board may well not know which circuit's law will be applied
on a petition for review," the Board did not have to apply the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing in D.R. Horton in deciding Murphy Oil.9 6
In 2016, the Seventh Circuit split from the Fifth Circuit's position and af-
firmed the NLRB in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corporation, deciding that Section 7 of
the NLRA's protection for "concerted activities" included employees' right to en-
gage in class, representative, and collective legal processes.97 As a result, the court
held, the NLRA rendered unenforceable any contract provision purporting to
waive employees' access to such remedies and the FAA did not preclude the
agency action."
Soon thereafter, the Ninth Circuit reinforced the circuit split in Morris v.
Ernst & Young, LLP.99 Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that a
"concerted action waiver" violated the NLRA and was therefore unenforceable.
93. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357-62 (5th Cir. 2013).
94. See 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Oct. 28, 2014).
9s. Id.
96. Murphy Oil USA v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015) ("We do not celebrate the
Board's failure to follow our D.R. Horton reasoning, but neither do we condemn its nonacqui-
escence."). A person can seek review of an NLRB decision in the circuit court in the place
where the employer allegedly engaged in the unfair labor practice in question, the circuit court
in any place where the person resides or transacts business, or the D.C. Circuit. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (2012).
97. 823 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (7 th Cir. 2016). In between the Fifth Circuit's Murphy Oil decision and
the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Epic Systems, the Eighth Circuit (in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.)
and Second Circuit (in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP) both held that class waivers in arbi-
tration agreements are enforceable in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases, declining the
plaintiffs' requests that the court follow the NLRB's reasoning in D.R. Horton that the labor
statute (in this case, the FLSA rather than the NLRA) protected the right to collective action.
See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3 d 1oo, 1053-55 (8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst &
Young LLP, 726 F.3 d 290, 296-99 (2d Cir. 2013).
98. See Epic Systems, 823 F.3 d at 1156-60.
99. 834 F.3 d 975 ( 9 th Cir. 2016).
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Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that the NLRA's ban on barring concerted legal
claims did not ban arbitration and therefore, that the court's holding was not
inconsistent with the FAA jurisprudence. According to the court, the concerted
action waiver would be illegal even if the employment agreement had a clause
requiring all disputes to be resolved in court rather than through arbitration-
and therefore, that the arbitration was mandatory did not affect the court's deci-
sion.00
In January 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Epic, Murphy Oil,
and Ernst & Young, consolidating the three cases,101 and the cases were heard in
October 2017.102 Even as this litigation proceeded, however, the NLRB contin-
ued to reinforce its position that employees cannot waive their rights to bring
NLRA claims as a class in related cases. 10 3
2. Litigation Rulemaking and Rule 23
In declining to defer to the Fifth Circuit's ruling in D.R. Horton and reaffirm-
ing its own position against the enforceability of class waivers in employer-em-
ployee arbitration agreements, the NLRB has pursued a policy of nonacquies-
cence. As a general matter, nonacquiescence refers to an agency's refusal to
conduct its own proceedings consistently with adverse rulings of federal courts
of appeals.104 The NLRB is known for nonacquiescence, having reserved the
right to nonacquiesce in its own adjudications since at least 1944-10s The result
is that the agency's approach to pressing its view of the law often places it in a
tug-of-war with the courts. In this most recent series of cases, the NLRB has -
notwithstanding pro-arbitration, anti-class action jurisprudence and federal
ioo. Id. at 984-85.
101. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris, 137 S. Ct.
809 (2017); NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
102. See October Term 2017, SUP. CT. U.S. (2017), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments
/argument caendars/MonthlyArgumentCalOctober2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TUM
-S8BX].
103. See, e.g., On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189 (2015) (holding that an
opt-out provision in an arbitration agreement is ineffective and an additional burden on em-
ployees' protected rights to pursue collective action); PJ Cheese, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 177
(2015) (holding that the six-month statute of limitations in § 10(b) of the NLRA is ineffective
even if the employees signed the arbitration agreement more than six months before an unfair
labor practice charge was filed with the NLRB).
104. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by FederalAdministrative Agencies,
98 YALE L.J. 679, 681 (1989).




court decisions rejecting the agency's D.R. Horton position- continued to voice
its disapproval of class waivers in employer-employee arbitration agreements.
This nonacquiescence through adjudication has yielded a novel interpreta-
tion of litigants' rights to class relief. The NLRB has held that employees have a
right to seek class relief under the NLRA and that any waivers of this right are
unenforceable as a matter of law. This legal conclusion, reaffirmed through one
agency adjudication after another, constituted an implicit amendment o Rule
23.
To be clear, the agency and courts did not justify their decisions as reinter-
pretations of Rule 23. Rather, the NLRB held that its decisions were grounded
in the agency's interpretation of section 7 of the NLRA,10 6 and the Seventh Cir-
cuit said the same."o7 The purpose of this reasoning was to draw a distinction
between Rule 23 establishing a "procedural" right to a class action, and section 7
creating a "substantive" right to class relief. By reading the right to class relief as
inherent in the NLRA, the agency could find that this "substantive" right sur-
vived pro-arbitration FAA case law.10s But notwithstanding the stated distinc-
tions between "substantive" and "procedural" rights, the effect of the NLRB de-
cisions was the same: allowing employees to bring arbitral class actions in
employment cases. The outcome would have been no different had the agency
carved out an exception for class relief under Rule 23 instead of section 7. The
Seventh Circuit implicitly recognized the equivalence, reasoning that the NLRA
was "not written on a clean slate" and instead, incorporated the widely accepted
equitable class and collective procedure practices that had been in existence since
at least the nineteenth century."o0 Thus, the NLRB's adjudications effected a nu-
anced amendment o the Federal Rules regime.
Thus, the NLRB is engaging in litigation rulemaking, establishing rules for
how judges should approach claims brought to their courtrooms. When litiga-
tion rulemaking takes the form of adjudication, nonacquiescence serves as a tool
for the agency to promulgate its views, particularly when the federal courts dis-
agree with the agency. Although agency adjudication is nominally only between
the two parties in a dispute, when combined with a policy of nonacquiescence,
it leads to the creation of a rule that the agency applies consistently to similarly
situated parties, in defiance of the federal courts. The end result resembles a rule
that emerges from notice-and-comment, albeit one that is memorialized in the
Federal Reporter rather than in the Federal Register. Although the courts retain
1o6. See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2286 (2012).
107. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3 d 1147, 1161 (7 th Cir. 2016).
108. See id.; AT&T LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'1
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
iog. See Epic Systems, 823 F.3d at 1154.
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their power of judicial review over this agency action, the NLRB's policy on class
waivers reflects adjudication-based litigation rulemaking in action.
IV. AGENCIES AT THE BACK END
Not only have agencies regulated access to courts on the front end, but they
have also set rules about the relief that courts may grant parties. In recent years,
agencies have issued guidance regulating the confidentiality of court orders and
settlement agreements. At he same time, one agency has begun the process of
regulating the distribution of class action settlements, which typically takes place
at the end of litigation. Both in the context of court secrecy and of class action
settlement distributions, agencies are prescribing the nature of the remedial re-
lief that federal courts may award to parties before them.
A. Confidential Court Orders and Settlement Agreements
Federal litigation has long been wracked by debates about the extent to
which court proceedings should be kept confidential. Court secrecy can range
from shielding court processes, such as trials, hearings, and status conferences,
from the public eye to sealing court orders and settlements. In recent years, a
growing number of scholars have called for greater transparency in litigation. As
Judith Resnik argues, open and public courts reinforce equality by "performing
a commitment that disputants are equal."1 0 By promoting a shared understand-
ing of what law is and how it is made, open access to courts strengthens demo-
cratic self-governance."'
The Federal Rules cover court secrecy in Rule 26. Rule 26 lists detailed re-
quirements for discovery, disclosure, and protective orders in federal civil suits.
Among other things, it states that a court may issue a protective order "for good
cause" in order to protect a party or person "from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense."112 Although legislatures have enacted
statutes to limit court secrecy, " agency action in this arena has not yet been well
documented, nor connected to the Federal Rules governing the confidentiality
of court orders and settlement agreements. But recent agency action reveals the
role of litigation rulemaking on the back end of federal court adjudication and
how agencies' effective amendments to the Federal Rules can shape lawsuits.
11o. Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based
Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-IENT L. REV. 521, 537 (20o6).
iii. See id. at 537, 570.
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).




1. NHTSA & CPSC Best Practices for Protective Orders and Settlement
Agreements
In March 2016, the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA) issued guidance urging parties and courts involved in motor vehicle
safety lawsuits to include provisions in protective orders or settlement agree-
ments that allow for the disclosure of relevant auto safety information to
NHTSA and other appropriate government authorities.114 In issuing this guid-
ance, NHTSA pointed to recent investigations involving the Takata airbag recalls
and General Motors ignition switches as examples of how identifying motor ve-
hicle risks early can help protect public safety and welfare."'
Current law requires industry participants to report certain information to
NHTSA, but not all stakeholders fulfill these reporting obligations in a timely
manner. In particular, confidentiality restrictions embedded in protective orders
or settlement agreements in private litigation, whether court sanctioned or pri-
vately negotiated, prevent parties from providing information about motor ve-
hicle safety concerns to the agency.116 NHTSA's new guidance seeks to combat
this secrecy. The guidance asks judges and litigants to prevent safety defect in-
formation from being completely shielded in sealed court documents so that the
agency can gather the information that it needs to set appropriate motor vehicle
safety standards and ensure compliance with federal standards.
According to the agency, protective orders, settlements, or ther confidenti-
ality agreements that bar information obtained in private litigation from being
conveyed to NHTSA violate Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
its state-law parallels, which require a showing of good cause for imposing con-
fidentiality."' The agency recognized that under Rule 26, courts have the discre-
tion to decide whether to restrict access to certain documents upon a showing of
good cause but determined that the "public's interest in access to court records
is the strongest when the records concern public health or safety."" Therefore,
NHTSA urged courts and litigants to carve out exceptions permitting the dis-
114. See NHTSA Enforcement Guidance Bulletin 2015-01: Recommended Best Practices for Pro-
tective Orders and Settlement Agreements in Civil Litigation, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,026, 13,027-28
(Mar. 11, 2016).
115. See id. at 13,027.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 13,026-27.
118. See id. at 13,028. The agency cited state laws and various public policy considerations that
supported its position that public health and safety are relevant considerations in determining
whether the confidentiality of court documents is appropriate. See id. at 13,028-30.
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closure of confidential information relating to safety defects to the agency, find-
ing that complete confidentiality would not meet the "good cause" requirement
otherwise, given the risks to public health and safety.
In December 2016, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
adopted parallel guidance, modeled on NHTSA's, pushing for transparency in
court orders in cases involving consumer protection. 9̀ Specifically, the CPSC's
guidance urges parties and courts to ensure that protective orders, confidential-
ity agreements, and settlements specifically allow for disclosure of relevant con-
sumer product safety defects to the CPSC and other government public health
and safety agencies. The guidance points to safety information related to dan-
gerous playground equipment, collapsible cribs, and all-terrain vehicles that was
kept from the CPSC by protective orders in private litigation. In order to address
the lack of transparency with respect to these court orders, the guidance provides
draft language that parties can use to create exceptions to confidentiality desig-
nations and to permit parties to report relevant information to the CPSC and
other relevant agencies.
Like NHTSA's guidance, the CPSC guidance addressed inconsistent report-
ing from parties involved in private litigation. Under current law, certain cate-
gories of manufacturers, retailers, and distributors are statutorily required to re-
port to the CPSC when they find that a product does not comply with a law or
that it contains a defect that could create either a substantial product hazard or
an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death.120 However, these stakeholders
ig. See CPSC Litigation Guidance and Recommended Best Practices for Protective Orders and
Settlement Agreements in Private Civil Litigation, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,023 (Dec. 2, 2016). The
Commissioner who proposed the guidance stated that the agency chose to publish the guid-
ance without notice and comment because it was "not required, nor helpful," in this case. The
APA does not require notice and comment for guidance, and it informs the public of the rel-
evant legal authorities and best practices without imposing any new legal duties on parties.
Therefore, as the sponsoring Commissioner put it, "seeking comment [in this case] simply
ties up precious CPSC resources, and needlessly delays safety-enhancing action." Press Re-
lease, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Statement of Commissioner Marietta S. Rob-
inson on CPSC Litigation Guidance and Recommended Best Practices for Protective Orders
and Settlement Agreement in Private Civil Litigation (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.cpsc.gov
/about-cpsc/commissioner/marietta-s-robinson/statements/statement-of-commissioner
-marietta-s-2 [http://perma.cc/JNSH-MBF8]. In contrast, NHTSA solicited comments on its
proposed guidance and responded to them in its final publication of the guidance in the Fed-
eral Register. See NHTSA Enforcement Guidance Bulletin 2015- ol: Recommended Best Prac-
tices for Protective Orders and Settlement Agreements in Civil Litigation, 81 Fed. Reg. at
13,026.
120. See CPSC Litigation Guidance and Recommended Best Practices for Protective Orders and
Settlement Agreements in Private Civil Litigation, 81 Fed. Reg. at 87,023 (citing 15 U.S.C.




often fail to meet their reporting requirements. If these stakeholders then enter
into protective orders in private litigation relating to consumer products, other
parties, including those without the statutory obligations, may be prevented
from sharing important product safety information that they have discovered
with the agency.121 Moreover, to shield incriminating documents discovered be-
fore trial, defendants often demand blanket productive orders as a condition of
settlement.122 The guidance is aimed at allowing the agency to collect infor-
mation regarding consumer product-related safety hazards in a timely way so
that the agency can address consumer safety issues as they arise and stem con-
sumer harm before it becomes widespread. 123
2. Litigation Rulemaking and Rule 26
Both NHTSA and the CPSC explicitly invoked the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in their guidance. Specifically, both agencies stated that their guidance
furthered the goal of transparency and public welfare inherent in Rule 26. The
CPSC guidance expressly relied on NHTSA's legal analysis, asserting that when
protective orders and settlement agreements "shield relevant and actionable
safety information behind nondisclosure provisions, they violate the good-cause
requirement of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, its state corollar-
ies, and the well-established public policy favoring protecting public health and
safety."124
Rule 26(c) states that any party from whom discovery is sought may move
for a protective order to shield documents. As explained above, under Rule 26,
the court may issue a protective order, for good cause, in order to protect a party
from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."125
The Rule includes examples of the kinds of protective orders that a federal court
may issue, for instance, forbidding the disclosure or discovery of information,
designating the persons who may be present when the discovery is conducted,
or sealing a deposition.12 6
121. See id. at 87,o23-24.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 87,023 ("The timely collection of information regarding consumer product-related
safety hazards is essential for carrying out the Commission's public health and safety mis-
sion.").
124. See id. at 87,024.
125. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c).
126. See id.
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As written, Rule 26 does not prohibit parties from shielding motor vehicle
or product safety information from the relevant federal agencies. However, the
NHTSA and CPSC guidance interpret Rule 26's good-cause requirement to
foreclose courts from issuing protective orders or sealing court documents so as
to prevent the disclosure of safety defect information to the agencies. In so doing,
the agencies expanded Rule 26's good-cause requirement to limit the confiden-
tiality of court orders or settlement agreements in cases involving automobile or
product safety defects.
Litigation rulemaking in this context differs from the previous examples be-
cause guidance is not final agency action and is legally nonbinding. 127 In practice,
however, guidance can have binding effect, much like rulemaking and adjudica-
tion. For instance, if private parties reasonably believe that failure to follow the
guidance will have adverse consequences, then guidance can have practically
binding effect.128 This is particularly the case when parties are repeat players be-
fore agencies, interacting with or appearing before them multiple times. Addi-
tionally, even though the agencies may disclaim the legally binding nature of the
document, it can effectively harden into a fixed rule with binding effect if the
agencies choose to apply or enforce it consistently.129
For instance, although neither NHTSA nor the CPSC have avowed an inten-
tion to enforce their guidance, if, in the future, the agencies were to make final
agency action contingent upon the parties adopting these new provisions, then
127. The APA requires notice and comment for all agency rulemaking unless the agency is issuing
"interpretative rules" or "general statements of policy." 5 U.S.C. § 5 53(b) (2012); see John F.
Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893, 893 (2004). Interpretative rules
and general statements of policy are collectively considered "guidance" or "nonlegislative
rules." To prevent agencies from avoiding the requirements of the APA when they promulgate
rules, an extensive doctrinal framework governs courts' distinctions between legislative rules
and guidance. Courts focus primarily on whether a nonlegislative rule has a "binding" effect
and if so, whether that effect is merely an interpretation of an existing statute or legislative
rule. If the rule is binding and not merely interpretative, then it will likely be considered a
legislative rule, and therefore, courts will require the agency to satisfy the procedural rule-
making requirements in order for it to be lawful agency action. See Manning, supra, at 893-
94.
128. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like -
Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1328-29 (1992). Robert
Anthony argues that if an agency intends a document to be legally binding, then the document
should be issued as a legislative rule instead of as guidance. See id. at 1327; see also Nicholas R.
Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance: An Institutional Perspective, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. 37 (Oct. 12,
2017), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/parrillo-agency-guidance-final
-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/7N97-ADNG].




this guidance may appear to have the legally binding characteristics of a legisla-
tive rule.3 o Take, for instance, the CPSC, which regularly conducts investiga-
tions of potential violations of federal consumer product safety laws."' If the
agency were to make decisions in the course of its investigations - such as
whether to issue subpoenas for information from manufacturers or whether to
threaten certain civil penalties - on the basis of whether the manufacturers under
investigation had complied with the best-practices guidance, the effect would be
to make the guidance practically binding.
Guidance can also be a way for agencies to conduct "trial runs" of litigation
rulemaking before crystallizing these changes to the Federal Rules through no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication. For instance, if guidance proves
effective, then an agency may formalize it into a rule through notice and com-
ment. The agency can then justify the new rule by referencing the effectiveness
of the nonbinding guidance. On the other hand, if the guidance is effective in
certain instances but not sufficiently widely adopted, then an agency can imple-
ment the same rule through notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication in
order to oblige greater compliance.
By issuing this novel guidance, these agencies have responded to concerns
about federal court secrecy and transparency by imposing additional rules atop
Rule 26's existing procedural requirements. Through litigation rulemaking,
these agencies have ffectively amended the Federal Rules regime, tailoring the
procedural rules that govern certain federal cases in furtherance of the agencies'
goals of promoting public health and safety.
B. Class Action Settlements
Litigation rulemaking by agencies has also played a role in class action set-
tlements. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), courts are tasked with
reviewing and authorizing proposed class action settlements in order to ensure
their fairness.132 After a judge approves a class settlement, however, there is typ-
ically little to no reporting of how effective the notice to class members was, how
130. See id. ("It is possible that an agency will use mandatory or rigid language even though it does
not intend the document to be regularly applied without further consideration. There is nev-
ertheless a practical binding effect if private parties suffer or reasonably believe they will suffer
by noncompliance.").
131. See Office of Gen. Counsel, Staff Guidance on Enforcement of Civil Penalties, U.S. CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION (Sept. 2015), http://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/OGC
EnforcementGuidance-o.pdf [http://perma.cc/A8Y2-PXSB].
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
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the settlement was distributed to class members, or what percentage of the set-
tlement fund was eventually paid out.' More often than not, a class action set-
tlement is administered by one of a handful of large companies that specialize in
identifying, notifying, and handling claims by class members.13 4 These claims
administrators typically keep the claims rates confidential.' The result has been
nearly complete obscurity of the effectiveness of class action settlements and dis-
tributions, despite Rule 23's formal requirement hat a court only approve a set-
tlement if it is "fair, reasonable, and adequate."13 6
Class members typically lack the incentives to monitor the claims distribu-
tion and the behavior of class counsel because monitoring is costly relative to
each participant's individual stake."' This is particularly true in the context of
consumer class actions, which usually involve only small dollar amounts recov-
ered by each class member.' Some judges have scrutinized class notices, claims
rates, and the adequacy of class counsel more closely, attempting to ensure that
Rule 23(e)'s requirements are not rendered meaningless. For instance, in one re-
cent case involving an allegedly defective trigger mechanism in a line of rifles, a
court found that the initial claims rate was less than one percent of the class,
leading the court to demand an improved notice program for the class action
settlement."' Other judges rigorously scrutinize proposed class settlements at
133. See Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class Action Outcomes?
Empirical Research on the Availability of ClassAction Claims Data, RAND INST. FOR Civ. JUST. 2
(July 2008), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working-papers/2oo8/RAND
jWR599.pdf [http://perma.cc/85PM-EYZA] ("Ironically, a veil of secrecy can fall over class
action litigation the moment the judge signs off on the agreement."); see also id. at 34 ("Our
efforts demonstrate that it is very difficult, even for researchers with significant resources, to
find distribution data in completed class action lawsuits . . . . What this means is that court
records themselves typically do not contain distribution data and class action participants are
generally unwilling to provide it to interested persons. In other words, the data are neither
publicly available nor privately provided.").
134. Alison Frankel, FTC's Class Action Claims Investigation Could Be "Bombshell" for Consumer
Cases, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-ftc-idUSKBNi
3A2MU [http://perma.cc/6ACM-TXAQ].
135. See id.
136. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(2).
137. See Adam S. Zimmerman, DistributingJustice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 5oo, 512-13 (2011).
138. See id. at 517.
139. See Frankel, supra note 134; see also Perry Cooper, More Judges Eying Class Claims Data? If So,
Then What?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.bna.com/judges-eying-class
-n57982o67030 [http://perma.cc/KDD9-SYF7] (describing how one judge who asked a set-
tlement administrator to report the claims filed and the payouts to class members at the final




the preliminary approval stage on a regular basis, reasoning that the court's in-
quiry about whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate should be
just as serious at the initial stage as at final approval. 140 But courts vary in their
approaches and, despite their efforts, lack information about he effectiveness of
class settlements. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has decided to tackle
this problem head on.
1. FTC Orders to Claims Administrators
In November 2016, the FTC announced that it had issued orders to eight
claims administrators asking them to detail the procedures they use to notify
class members about settlements and the response rates for various methods of
notification.141 The FTC called for the claims administrators to disclose infor-
mation about their ten largest cases in each of the last three years, which trans-
lates to a request for data on notice procedures and claims rates in a total of 240
class actions. This order is expected to result in the largest-ever database of in-
formation about participation in consumer class actions. The FTC has not
named the eight companies that received orders, but two large claims adminis-
trators, Epiq and Analytics, have reported that they received and are reviewing
FTC data requests.14 2
The FTC voted 3-0 to issue these orders, stating that it was authorized to
issue them under Section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,143 which
permits the FTC to require entities to file "annual or special . .. reports or an-
swers in writing to specific questions" in order to gather information about an
organization, individual, or other entity.144 The agency is also authorized to
140. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1036-37 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see also Perry
Cooper, Five Tips To Green Light Class Settlements, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www
.bna.com/five-tips-green-n73o14470892 [http://perma.cc/7G3S-UWU5].
141. See FTC Seeks To Study Class Action Settlements, FTC (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.ftc
.gov/news-events/press-releases/2ol6/11/ftc-seeks-study-class-action-settlements [ht p://
perma.cc/Q9LF-29YN]. It is not clear from either news reports or the FTC's own statements
describing these orders whether the orders are binding and what their legal status is.
142. See Frankel, supra note 134.
143. See FTC Seeks To Study Class Action Settlements, supra note 141.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 4 6(b) (2012); seeABrief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative and
Law Enforcement Authority, FTC (July 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do
/enforcement-authority [http://perma.cc/9DR7-EC6F].
As with subpoenas and [civil investigative demands], the recipient of a 6(b) order
may file a petition to limit or quash, and the Commission may seek a court order
requiring compliance. In addition, the Commission may commence suit in Federal
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'"make public from time to time' portions of the information that it obtains,
where disclosure would serve the public interest."145
The orders are part of the agency's broader litigation rulemaking efforts
through the Class Action Fairness Project, which is focused on studying class
action settlements related to consumer protection and competition in order to
ensure that these settlements "provide appropriate benefits to consumers."14 6 As
a part of the project, the FTC "monitors class actions and files amicus briefs or
intervenes in appropriate cases; coordinates with state, federal, and private
groups on important class action issues; and monitors the progress of legislation
and class action rule changes."147 The project also includes the Notice Study,148
which is analyzing consumer understanding of class action notices, and the De-
ciding Factors Study,149 which is looking at the factors that influence consumers'
decisions to participate in a class action settlement.0̀
2. Litigation Rulemaking and Rule 23
The FTC's orders reflect a first step toward regulating class action settle-
ments through litigation rulemaking. In an effort to begin addressing the gap
between a court's ex ante approval of a class action settlement and low ex post
claims rates, the FTC issued these orders and initiated the two studies relating
to consumer understanding of class action notices and participation in class ac-
tion settlements. The FTC's efforts resemble the beginning of a process to revise
Rule 23 to take actual claims rates into account in determining whether a class
action settlement is sufficiently fair. Whether the FTC issues a rule in response
court under Section io of the FTC Act ... against any party who fails to comply
with a 6(b) order after receiving a notice of default from the Commission ....
The Commission's 6(b) authority enables it to conduct wide-ranging economic
studies that do not have a specific law enforcement purpose ... . Section 6(b) ena-
bles the Commission to obtain answers to specific questions as part of an antitrust
law enforcement investigation, where such information would not be available
through subpoena because there is no document that contains the desired answers.
A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority,
supra.
145. See id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (2012)).
146. FTC Seeks To Study Class Action Settlements, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. See Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request, 82
Fed. Reg. 32,816 (July 18, 2017); Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collec-
tion; Comment Request, So Fed. Reg. 25,676 (May 5, 2015).
149. See id. at 25,677.




to the data on consumer class action settlements or leaves the task to the federal
courts, its efforts can inform a revision of Rule 23 that takes into account actual
claims settlement processes. Alternatively, the FTC's data can be used by courts
applying the Rule 23(e) standard to decide whether to approve class settlements.
In fact, the FTC's efforts are being complemented by the formal court rule-
making process. The Rules Committee recently submitted proposed Rule 23
amendments to the Supreme Court addressing these very issues. Like the FTC,
the Committee identified gaps in notice rates to potential class members and is
focused on improving this process. The Committee has proposed changing the
Rule to encourage administrators to notify class members by email and other
electronic means, not just regular postal mail."' Additionally, the Committee
proposed a list of factors that the court should take into account in determining
whether a class settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e),
including the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal, the claims distribution
process, and the timing and payment of attorney's fees.152 This list of factors
expressly includes "the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing re-
lief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims" as a
new subsection Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii).ss This, too, illustrates the overlap be-
tween the agency's efforts to gather data about and regulate claims settlements
and the Rules Committee's attempts to require federal judges to take similar fac-
tors into account.
151. See Memorandum from Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Rules Comm. Chief Counsel, to Scott S. Har-
ris, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the U.S. 266-67 (Oct. 4, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Proposed
Amendments], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2o17-10-04-Supreme-Court
-Package-o.pdf [http://perma.cc/9XX5-MU3M].
152. Id. at 269-70.
153. Id. at 269. See id. at 213-14. In an earlier Note to the proposed Rule 23 amendments, the Rules
Committee stated,
Measuring the proposed relief may require evaluation of the proposed claims pro-
cess and a prediction of how many claims will be made; if the notice to the class
calls for pre-approval submission of claims, actual claims experience may be im-
portant. The contents of any agreement identified ... may also bear on the ade-
quacy of the proposed relief, particularly regarding the equitable treatment of all
members of the class.
Memorandum from Hon. John D. Bates, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Jef-
frey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (July 1, 2016), in COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, BANK-
RUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 226, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files
/2o16-o8-preliminary draft-of rules formspublished for publicqcomment-o.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GS76-FQ4C].
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The overlaps between the FTC's goals and the Committee's proposed
amendments demonstrate how agencies and courts can work together in amend-
ing the Federal Rules regime. The information that the FTC uncovers through
its orders can be used to regulate claims administrators and require them to im-
prove their processes, or even just to disclose claims rates to judges. At the same
time, the court rulemaking reveals that courts are beginning to scrutinize claims
rates and the adequacy of class settlement procedures at preliminary and final
approval and even seeking to memorialize these changes in the text of Rule 23.
The synchrony of these efforts illustrates how litigation rulemaking and court
rulemaking need not be in conflict; rather, agencies and courts can use their
strengths to amend the Federal Rules together. The next Part delves further into
these dynamics.
V. AGENCIES AS LITIGATION RULEMAKERS
The examples in the preceding sections are just a few illustrations of agency
actions that effectively amend the Federal Rules regime. Although the text of the
Rules remains the same, these agencies are implicitly amending the Rules by
limiting how federal judges apply the Rules. For instance, on its own, Rule 12
does not limit the discretion of judges faced with motions to compel arbitration.
But by issuing a rule banning predispute binding arbitration, the CMS directed
judges to deny these Rule 12 motions in an entire class of cases. To take another
example, Rule 26 allows courts to restrict access to court filings given good cause.
As written, the Rule grants judges wide latitude to determine the appropriate
scope of protective orders. However, the NHTSA and CPSC guidance urges
courts to decide that Rule 26 requests to restrict the disclosure of auto and prod-
uct safety information do not meet the good-cause requirement. By cabining the
judicial discretion inherent in the Rules, these agencies are amending the base-
line that the Rules establish. This is what characterizes these actions as litigation
rulemaking.154
154. Whether to call this "interpretation" or "amendment" is in some sense a semantic choice. In-
terpretations can be narrow or broad, like amendments. This is why judicial decisions that
"interpret" statutes often have the same effect as legislative "amendments," altering the mean-
ing and application of statutes. See Edward Rubin, It's Time To Make the Administrative Proce-
dure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELLL. REV. 95, 104-05, 104 n.43 (2003). To the extent that
both "interpretations" and "amendments" can change the meaning of laws (including the
Federal Rules) and limit the discretion of future courts, the two terms may be interchangeable.
See, e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 13, at 16o6 ("In addition, in our view, all of the deci-





Given this descriptive understanding, this Part turns to the question of how
litigation rulemaking compares to court rulemaking. An initial comparison re-
veals the unmistakable similarities between the two approaches, bolstering the
legitimacy of litigation rulemaking. An analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of
litigation rulemaking follows. The benefits include the ability of agencies to mar-
shal their expertise, solve multifaceted, multi-party problems, and make proce-
dural and substantive law more coherent. The drawbacks include special-interest
influence on agency decision making and the erosion of transsubstantive law. On
net, however, the benefits of litigation rulemaking appear to outweigh the costs.
In addition, litigation rulemaking provokes institutional questions new and
old- about the legitimacy of this kind of agency action in our broader system of
government, about the nature and impact of this new dialectic between agencies
and courts, and about he effect of procedural rulemaking on substantive law.
A. Court Rulemaking Versus Litigation Rulemaking
To understand why litigation rulemaking matters - and whether it is legiti-
mate - the first step is to compare it to court rulemaking, the established process
for drafting and amending the Federal Rules. The resemblances are striking, and
the structural similarities between the two processes reinforce the legitimacy of
the newer agency-led approach.
Both court rulemaking and litigation rulemaking are rooted in statutory del-
egations of authority from Congress. Just as the courts write the Rules under the
authority of the Rules Enabling Act,155 agencies engage in litigation rulemaking
on the basis of specific statutory grants of authority (for instance, the Dodd-
Frank Act). Courts ensure this remains the case, since the very function of judi-
cial review under the APA is to ensure agency fidelity to statutory intent.
More commonly, "interpretation" refers to divining the meaning of a text by referencing
the drafter's underlying intent. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 405-62 (1989). This is not what litigation rulemaking typically
entails. As litigation rulemakers, agencies are not attempting to uncover the underlying intent
of either the Rules Committee or Congress. Put another way, these agencies are not claiming
that the Rules were meant to be read or applied one way or the other. Rather, these agencies
are deciding that the Rules should be applied a certain way, without reference to drafters' in-
tent, usually in light of other statutory commands and contemporary legal realities (such as
the rise of mandatory arbitration). Therefore, these agency actions are better described as im-
plicitly amending - rather than interpreting - the Federal Rules regime.
155. Cf Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the
Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REv.
1303, 1334-35 (20o6) (arguing that Congress should not have delegated rulemaking authority
to the courts and the Rules Enabling Act should be held to violate the separation of powers).
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In addition, the role of the judiciary in court rulemaking mirrors the role of
administrative agencies in litigation rulemaking.156 Like an agency, the Court is
delegated power by Congress to craft the law-in this case, the law of civil pro-
cedure - through a combination of rulemaking and adjudication. Rulemaking
takes place through the seven-stage drafting process, and adjudication yields
novel interpretations of the written Rules. 15 7 Like administrative agencies, the
Court faces an ongoing choice between amending the Rules through the rule-
making process and reinterpreting the Rules through adjudicative decisions.5
Because the Rules Enabling Act delegates the power "to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure""' to the Court, some have analogized the Rules as
"akin to agency regulations."16 0 Others have called for a "Chevron-inspired ef-
erence regime" to the Court's interpretation of the Rules.161 The debates about
the appropriate role of the Court in expanding or restraining the Rules even echo
debates about the appropriate authority of administrative agencies. And even if
the role of the Supreme Court in drafting the Federal Rules is limited,162 the
overall bureaucracy of the Judicial Conference, its Standing Committee, and the
156. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 7, at 1194, 1202-05.
157. See id. at 1195-96 (describing how Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), are examples of the Court authoring and amending the
law of civil procedure through adjudication as well as the formal rulemaking process). But see
Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 123, 146-47 (2015) (stating that
the Court's actual role in the rulemaking process is not well understood and may at times have
been "perfunctory" although this may lead the Court to express its views on the Rules through
adjudication).
is8. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 7, at 1206. At times, the Court has expressed skepticism
of judicial decisions that reinterpret the scope of the Rules. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 861 (1999) (" [W]e are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adop-
tion, and ... we are not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in
the Rules Enabling Act."); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) ("The
text of a [Federal Rule] thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial inventiveness. Courts are
not free to amend a Rule outside the process Congress ordered. . . ."); see also sources cited
supra note 14.
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).
16o. See Porter, supra note 157, at 125 & n.8. Some have analogized the Court to an administrative
agency in order to advocate for either rulemaking or adjudication as a preferred approach for
amending the Rules. See Marcus, supra note 7, 929-30 (contending that "courts should defer
to rulemaker expectations when they apply the Federal Rules in litigation" and "lack the pre-
rogative to apply them as they see fit"); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Inter-
preting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 15o U. PA. L. REv. 1099, 1102 (2002) (arguing that
"alterations to the Rules should undergo the process specified in the Enabling Act, rather than
taking effect through judicial fiat in the course of litigation").
161. See Porter, supra note 157, at 177.




five advisory committees, combined with rulemaking and adjudication, emulates
the structure of an administrative agency.
In fact, court rulemaking was changed in the late 198os to parallel the ad-
ministrative process. The 198os amendments required the Rules Committee to
hold open meetings and provide advance notice of these convenings. The
amendments also extended the time before proposed Rules would become effec-
tive from three to seven months. The goal of these reforms was to empower pub-
lic monitoring and interest group involvement and to decrease the need for con-
stant congressional oversight. Strikingly, these were the very aims of the APA
when it was passed in 1946.163 As a result, agency-led litigation rulemaking to-
day resembles court rulemaking in more ways than one. Both processes involve
technocratic lawmaking, expert input, public participation, and congressional
checks. Therefore, to the extent that court rulemaking reflects Congress's view
of what a legitimate process for drafting and amending the Rules looks like, lit-
igation rulemaking shares in this legitimacy.
Of course, not all agency-led litigation rulemaking is the same. 164 Notice-
and-comment rulemaking involves public participation (as with the CMS and
CFPB), similar to the comment and hearing periods during the court rulemak-
ing process. But because adjudications only bind the parties at hand, agencies do
not solicit broader public input when they decide which legal rule to apply, even
if the agency plans on applying that rule in all future disputes (as with the
NLRB). And because guidance is nonbinding, agencies sometimes solicit public
comment (as with NHTSA), and sometimes do not (as with the CPSC). But
when agencies depart from the norms of court rulemaking, their litigation rule-
making is typically constrained - adjudication is limited to the parties in a case,
and guidance is nonbinding.
The advent of litigation rulemaking, therefore, presents a novel institutional
pathway for changing the rules of federal civil litigation. Although the similari-
ties between court rulemaking and litigation rulemaking bolster the legitimacy
of this new approach, the institutions remain distinct. Next, I turn to the partic-
ular benefits and drawbacks of litigation rulemaking that stem from these insti-
tutional differences.
B. Benefits of Litigation Rulemaking
Agencies are structurally well equipped to act as litigation rulemakers for
several reasons. First, given their expertise and institutional capacity, agencies
163. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 13, at 1593-96.
164. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1383, 1396-97
(2004).
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are well suited to craft the appropriate procedural rules for particular areas of
law. Second, many of the problems that procedural rulemaking seeks to solve are
polycentric in nature and therefore better suited for agencies to resolve. Third,
in the process of interpreting and implementing their authorizing statutes, agen-
cies acting as litigation rulemakers can better align procedural regimes and con-
gressional priorities.
1. Domain-Level Expertise
First, agencies are adept at making domain-level determinations about the
appropriate rules for particular classes of claims. Like litigation gatekeeping, lit-
igation rulemaking involves "an interconnected mix of ground-level factual
questions about the enforcement landscape and higher-level, synthetic questions
about the overall 'coherence' of the regulatory regime."16 s Agencies (like legisla-
tures) have the ability to take a synoptic view of the regulatory regime and decide
the appropriate procedural rules for litigation in that arena. For instance,
NHTSA and the CPSC can survey the range of industries that they regulate,
identify gaps in the reporting of product safety defects, and determine the pro-
cedural rules that would remedy the problem. Based on this information, these
agencies can craft procedural rules like those embodied in their best practices
guidance for protective orders and settlement agreements. As Engstrom put it,
agencies, which are staffed with experts and embroiled in highly specific decision
making on a daily basis, are "likely to have defter command of these high- and
low-level issues than legislators."166 Likewise, agencies are often well suited to
engage in ongoing monitoring, and they can use this information to update pre-
vious rulemakings and decisions.167
Agencies' ability to marshal expertise helps them make these domain-specific
judgments. Expertise has long been a justification for delegating administration
to specialized agencies.168 As James Landis put it, in reflecting upon the rise of
165. See Engstrom, supra note 19, at 664.
166. Id.
167. See id. In contrast, in retail gatekeeping, the agency's task is "not forming broad-scale, 'legis-
lative' judgments about the net social costs or benefits of competing regulatory approaches
but rather a far more quotidian, 'adjudicative' sorting of more or less meritorious cases." Id.
168. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-26 (1938) (arguing that expertise
"springs only from that continuity of interest, that ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks
a year, year after year, to a particular problem"); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative
Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119




the New Deal-era administrative state, "the art of regulating an industry requires
knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to shift requirements as the con-
dition of the industry may dictate, ... and the power through enforcement o
realize conclusions as to policy."169 As bureaucracies with the staff, knowledge,
and experience to administer the relevant statutes and exercise authority in their
relevant domains, agencies like NHTSA and the CPSC have the expertise neces-
sary to evaluate what procedural regimes are necessary or helpful for particular
kinds of claims. The answer may vary by domain. Whereas limits on confiden-
tiality may further public health and safety in the context of consumer products,
the relative costs of limiting confidentiality could cut the opposite way in another
realm, such as national security or defense. Agencies can make these decisions
better than courts in part because they have the resources and capacity to gather
the necessary information. Agencies can hire experts, conduct studies, do field
work, and gather the data needed to customize the procedural rules for a partic-
ular set of claims.170 Moreover, agencies often have the legal and practical capac-
ity to acquire nonpublic information."' Agencies can marshal these institutional
advantages in litigation rulemaking, permitting procedural regimes to be tai-
lored to particular legal domains in a way that transsubstantive rulemaking does
not.
Courts, in contrast, have less inherent expertise and diminished capacity to
gather information. Judges and members of the Rules Committee are not neces-
sarily domain-specific experts - in product safety, consumer finance, health care,
or any other area.172 And although the Rules Committee solicits public comment
during the court rulemaking process, the public input is sometimes sparse and
may not always be subject area-specific.1 7 ' Although the court rulemaking pro-
cess mirrors litigation rulemaking in many ways, the two processes do not fully
function in the same way. Agencies can typically marshal their area-level exper-
tise more effectively. Even if public input is sparse, an administrative agency has
the ability, capacity, and practice of proactively gathering information in other
ways, since they frequently do so for nonprocedural agency action. Case-by-case
Court has cited agency "expertise asa justification for presuming congressional preference for
agency resolution of statutory ambiguities").
169. LANDIS, supra note 168, at 23-24.
170. See Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 CoLum. L. REV. 991, 1029 (2017).
171. See LANDIS, supra note 168, at 42-43; Deacon, supra note 170, at 1014-18.
172. See Membership of the Committee on Rules ofPractice and Procedure and Advisory Rules Committee,
U.S. CoUrs, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017_committee roster 0.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BDV9-JAQIK]. Although there are law professors and laVyers on the vari-
ous advisory committees, they are often generalist practitioners or civil procedure specialists.
173. See Struve, supra note 16o, at 1111-12.
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adjudication in the courts is even less driven by area-specific expertise. Courts
shaping the Federal Rules regime through cases like Iqbal and Twombly, or the
various NLRA suits in the federal courts, cannot engage in comprehensive infor-
mation gathering. Instead, the judges making these decisions are limited to the
briefing and their own research.
Relative to courts, agencies are particularly well suited to determine what
procedural regimes will improve social welfare broadly, rather than in the con-
text of a particularized dispute.174 For instance, an agency can better identify
when a limit on the confidentiality of protective orders and settlement agree-
ments in the motor vehicle and product safety contexts will advance the safety
of the American public."' An agency's specialized expertise in a particular area
of law and regulation makes it better positioned to make these broad-ranging
judgments than a judge presiding over a particular case or the Rules Commit-
tee.1 76 just as legislatures are often better positioned to make wholesale judg-
ments about regulating social and economic domains, agencies are better suited
than courts to craft the procedural rules that address wider ranging concerns.
2. Polycentric Problem Solving
Second, agencies are particularly well equipped to engage in polycentric de-
cision making. Polycentric decision making refers to dealing with disputes that
have implications beyond the two immediate parties to a controversy. Lon Fuller
famously described a polycentric problem as follows: "We may visualize this
kind of situation by thinking of a spider web. A pull on one strand will distribute
174. See Engstrom, supra note 19, at 668 (explaining that agencies evaluating the "merits" of a
private enforcement claim by looking more broadly at the social welfare or legislative fidelity
of the claim are "implement [ing] a conception of merit that is different from what judges or
juries would otherwise deliver," meaning that the gatekeeping is "tak[ing] on a fundamentally
different and more 'regulatory' character").
175. See Resnik, supra note 11o, at 565 ("As these problems are profoundly ones of social policy,
legislative engagement is needed to regulate the power of parties and judges either to enable
information generation through courts or to inhibit that potential.").
176. The value of agency expertise is reflected in agencies' internal adjudicative proceedings. As
litigants' access to class actions in courts has diminished in recent years, certain agencies have
devised their own internal procedures for processing multiple claims at once. Michael
Sant'Ambrogio and Adam Zimmerman describe the many benefits of agencies applying their
expertise to shape how different classes of claims are processed: increasing the efficiency and
consistency of legal proceedings, generating information, building the legitimacy of adjudi-
cation, complementing rulemaking, and bolstering agency enforcement. See Michael
Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 16oo,
1681-91 (2017). Many of these benefits carry over when agencies apply their expertise to shap-




tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a whole."1 7 7 A case
like this is complex not just because of the number of parties that could be af-
fected, but because the form of award or relief granted has repercussions on other
parties with stakes in the outcome of the dispute.17 ' A classic example is a lawsuit
between an employer and a labor union representing a class of workers. A court's
award of higher wages to certain workers - say, assembly line technicians - could
have ripple effects on the wages due to other kinds of workers -say, machin-
ists-who may not be parties to the dispute.179 According to Fuller, courts are
generally not well suited to resolve these sorts of polycentric problems.0̀ In con-
trast, agencies, with their ability to gather information from and involve all par-
ties, are much better suited to the task.18
Class action settlements are a prime example. The effectiveness of the notice
of settlement to the class will affect the recovery available to all members of the
class. If the class notice is effective, then more class members will file claims and
the claims rate will be higher. Depending on how unclaimed funds are distrib-
uted, a higher claims rate can decrease the size of the award available to each class
member. Thus, questions about how the notice should be written, what the ap-
propriate claims rate should be, and how settlements should be structured are
all issues that agencies are particularly well equipped to tackle as litigation rule-
makers. By establishing the procedural rules governing class actions, agencies
can bring their institutional capacity to bear on these polycentric problems.182
This, for example, is where the FTC comes in. Unlike the courts, the agency
has the institutional capacity to compel claims administrators to divulge data
about the distribution of class action settlements. Then, the agency can take one
of two approaches. It can make this data public for federal judges to take into
account in deciding what information to request in advance of approving a set-
tlement and whether to sign off on a settlement. Alternatively, the agency can
177. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 395 (1978).
178. See id.
179. See id. at 395-96.
180. See id. at 401-04.
181. Of course, many, if not all, lawsuits have effects on parties beyond the named plaintiffs and
defendants. The question is one of degree - some disputes have more polycentric dimensions
than others. See id. at 397. "It is a question of knowing when the polycentric elements have
become so significant and predominant that the proper limits of adjudication have been
reached." Id. at 398. The point here is simply that when it comes to disputes with particularly
polycentric elements, agencies may be better equipped than courts to craft the relevant proce-
dural rules.
182. " [T]he fact that an adjudicative decision affects and enters into a polycentric relationship does
not of itself mean that an adjudicative tribunal is moving out of its proper sphere," but rather,
that the agency has a role to play in shaping the tribunal's approach to the dispute. Id. at 403.
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use this information to promulgate a rule or issue guidance governing class ac-
tion settlements. In so doing, the agency can factor in the data that it has gath-
ered, its knowledge of the different kinds of industry actors, and consumer in-
terests across industries and geographies. With either approach, the agency can
taclde the polycentric problem of evaluating and addressing claims rates in a way
that courts cannot.
3. Coherence
Third, agencies are better able to align procedural regimes with congres-
sional priorities. Because agencies, unlike courts, must justify their actions in
light of their statutory mandates, litigation rulemaking can promote fidelity to
Congress's broader goals. Put another way, litigation rulemaking can improve
the coherence between a set of substantive interests - such as the goal of mini-
mizing consumer safety defects and protecting public health -and the proce-
dural regime in place for vindicating those interests.' NHTSA and the CPSC,
for instance, emphasized that their new guidance served two purposes: (1) ful-
filling the agencies' duty to protect public health and safety and (2) reinforcing
the statutory obligations of regulated parties to report safety defects. The guid-
ance aligned the procedural rules that govern product safety cases with the goals
of product safety statutes more broadly. Thus, NHTSA is carrying out its statu-
tory mandate not only by issuing substantive rules -for instance, rules about
what kinds of automobile airbags and arm rests will minimize car crashes -but
also procedural rules to accomplish the same legislative ends. As another exam-
ple, the CMS found that it could better achieve Congress's goal of protecting the
health and safety of elderly Medicare and Medicaid recipients by ensuring they
would not be subject to mandatory arbitration clauses. In so doing, the agency
sought to realign the substantive aims of the Social Security Act and the relevant
procedural regime.
Not every substantive statutory goal merits the same procedural regime. For
example, limiting the confidentiality of settlements is likely less appropriate for
trade secrets disputes, where intellectual property rights are more important,
than for product safety suits. Agencies, with their area-specific expertise and
staffs, are well equipped to make these nuanced decisions. Courts and the Rules
Committee, on the other hand, are institutionally and traditionally limited to
making transsubstantive changes to the Federal Rules. In part, this is due to the
183. One way to conceptualize coherence is that it "demands not only that the legal rules of a stat-
utory scheme be consistent but also that they reflect a unitary vision of that scheme." Richard





Rules Enabling Act's direction that the Court "prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure."184 Moreover, the Committee's practice of keeping the Rules
fairly transsubstantive over time reflects an implicit institutional constraint that
formal amendments be transsubstantive. This constraint, however, does not
bind agencies acting as litigation rulemakers. Litigation rulemaking can ensure
that the procedural regime does not frustrate congressional intent and that the
courts cannot use procedural formalities to stand in the way of Congress's aims.
C. Drawbacks of Litigation Rulemaking
But litigation rulemaking has its drawbacks. For one, agency capture might
mitigate the legitimacy and effectiveness of litigation rulemaking. If regulated
entities unduly influence an agency's behavior, then allowing the agency to
amend the procedural regime for federal courts may be less desirable. Second,
where the benefits of transsubstantivity override the value of domain-specific
litigation rulemaking, court rulemaking may be preferable.
1. Agency Capture
First, capture may corrode the quality of litigation rulemaking. A well-doc-
umented weakness of administrative agencies is that they often suffer from reg-
ulatory capture. Regulatory capture refers to the process by which the regulated
industry is able to push regulation in a direction away from the public interest
and toward the industry's own interests.' Powerful parties are able to shift the
regulatory process in this way "because they face more concentrated benefits or
costs and so have greater incentive to invest in information or lobbying efforts,
and also because they can better solve the collective action problems that often
stymie group-based political action."186
In the context of litigation rulemaking, certain parties might wield dispro-
portionate influence in agency decision making."' This influence could shape,
among other things, whether the agency action takes place, whether it is binding
184. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading,
Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Pro-
cedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 370 (2013).
185. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAP-
TURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To LIMIT IT 71, 73 (Daniel Carpenter & David
A. Moss eds., 2014).
186. Engstrom, supra note 19, at 674.
187. See id.
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or nonbinding, and whether it applies only prospectively or also retroactively.
Capture can detract from the agency's use of its expertise to set procedural rules,
promote fidelity to legislative goals, and ensure the equitable treatment of simi-
larly situated parties. Thus, capture can make litigation rulemaking both less ef-
fective and less fair.
However, court rulemaking may not be free of bias or its own form of cap-
ture, as reflected in the changing composition and preferences of the various
rulemaking committees. As initially structured, the 1930s committee for drafting
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not include any sitting judges.' Alt-
hough judges were eventually added to the committees, it was not until the
Court was led by Chief Justice Burger that the key committees "came to be dom-
inated by judges," who, as Burbank and Farhang have argued, "are presumably
more likely than lawyers or academics to protect institutional interests, as well
as [be] more susceptible to direction from on high."" 9 According to Burbank
and Farhang, the politicization of the process was made even more apparent by
the fact that the Chief Justice "markedly favored judges appointed by Republican
Presidents" in appointing individuals to the Advisory Committee and that the
Chief Justice had repeatedly made his disregard for the "litigation explosion" of
the 1970s clear.90
Furthermore, recent decades have seen interest groups active at all stages of
the rulemaking process, from advisory committee hearings to congressional re-
view.'9 These interest groups include the plaintiffs' bar, defense bar, civil rights
groups, corporations, and others.1 92 For instance, in 1983, interest group lobby-
ing blocked changes to the federal-service-of-process rule. 93 Controversies in-
volving the court rulemaking process and specific rulemaking proposals in the
1980s led to a series of amendments to the Rules Enabling Act that required
188. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 13, at 1587.
189. Id. at 1588; see also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litiga-
tion Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEv. L.J. 1559 (2015).
190. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 13, at 1588.
191. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy,
and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 903 (1999). The increase in public participation in
the rulemaking process is the result of deliberate changes by Congress to the rulemaking pro-
cess, including the creation of the Standing Committee, which is tasked with holding public
meetings on proposed revisions to the Rules. These changes were made as a part of amend-
ments to the Rules Enabling Act in the 1970s and 1980s. See Porter, supra note 157, at 145. "But
while these modifications are clearly intended to make the rulemaking process more transpar-
ent, more accountable to the public, and presumably more effective, it is unclear what effect,
if any, this revised process has on the Court's formal rulemaking power." Id.





rulemaking committees to hold open meetings, provide explanations with all
proposed rules, and issue reports detailing minority views on proposed rules.194
The amendments resulted in a court rulemaking process that resembled, in large
part, the APA's notice-and-comment and public hearing requirements for agency
action." Nevertheless, the politicization of court rulemaking has continued
apace since.1 96
To the extent that court rulemaking is itself influenced by these outside fac-
tors, it may be impossible to choose between litigation rulemaking or court rule-
making solely on the basis of which is less "politicized" or "captured'19 7 In fact,
Robert Bone has suggested that the politicization of the court rulemaking pro-
cess has undermined its legitimacy.198 Burbank and Farhang have pointed out
that the increased inclusiveness of the process has made it difficult to pass legis-
lation to block a Federal Rule, in part because transsubstantive rules inevitably
help some interests while harming others.'99 It's not clear, therefore, whether the
degree of politicization can help us meaningfully choose between an agency- or
court-led approach.
Moreover, we might tolerate weak capture. Weak capture refers to when spe-
cial interests compromise an agency's ability to serve the public interest, but the
public is still served by the regulation, relative to no regulation at all.2 00 On this
logic, even if capture is an unavoidable feature of litigation rulemaking, the re-
sulting procedural rules could still serve the public interest. In fact, weak capture
may be desirable if domain-specific litigation rulemaking has enough benefits of
its own.
194. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 13, at 1591-94.
195. See id. at 1595; see also supra Section V.A.
196. See Bone, supra note 191, at 903-07; see also Redish & Amuluru, supra note 155, 1315 (under-
scoring that "from the outset many of the Rules possessed a distinctly political nature because
the manner in which they are shaped inherently impacts the enforcement of society's substan-
tive policy choices").
197. It would be impossible to envision or create a perfectly technocratic rulemaking process in
which the only considerations taken i to account are what would make the system "work
better'" First, judgments about which rules for the system would be welfare-enhancing de-
pend on rulemakers' views about how to measure welfare or efficacy. Second, any human de-
cisionmaker is inherently and inevitably influenced both by his or her politics or policy pref-
erences and by his or her technocratic judgments grounded in expertise.
198. See Bone, supra note 191, at 907-08.
199. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 13, at 1596.
200. See Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To LIMIT IT, supra note 185 at 1, 12 (" [W]eak capture
prevails when the net social benefits of regulation are diminished as a result of special interest
influence, but remain positive overall.").
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2. Transsubstantivity
Others contend that the value of domain-specific procedural regimes is out-
weighed by the benefits of transsubstantivity. These arguments are bolstered by
the fact that the Federal Rules were meant to be transsubstantive.20 1 Rule 1
states: "These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceed-
ings .... They should be construed, administered, and employed by the court
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding."2 02 To many, this transsubstantivity is what makes the
Rules valuable - and not as politically contentious as they would otherwise be.
As David Marcus has described it, " [w] ere rulemakers to discriminate among
antecedent regimes for particularized procedural treatment, they would put at
risk the modicum of political neutrality that transsubstantivity otherwise of-
fers."203 Indeed, proposed rule amendments that have involved "specialized
treatment for particular categories of litigation," such as a 1990s proposal for a
maturity requirement for mass tort class actions, have provoked backlash.204 If
transsubstantive rules are in fact better able to avoid the pitfalls of political in-
fluence, court rulemaking may be preferable to agency-led litigation rulemak-
ing.205
But even Marcus concedes that transsubstantivity may be less desirable when
the legislature enacts domain-specific procedural law. 2 06 Legislatures possess
greater democratic accountability, competence in coordinating the aims of regu-
latory regimes through legislation, and capacities that make them more capable
of acting as procedural lawmakers.20 7 On this line of reasoning, because agencies
acting as litigation rulemakers function in a legislative capacity-under legisla-
tive authority delegated by Congress itself- litigation rulemaking should not be
limited to transsubstantive lawmaking in the way that court rulemaking is. If
201. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 512
(1986).
202. FED. R. CIv. P. i (emphasis added).
203. David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes ofAmerican Law, 2013 BYU L. REv. 1191,
1235 (2013).
204. See id. at 1235 & n.189.
205. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exor-
cism oftheBogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2074-
85 (1989).
2o6. See Marcus, supra note 203, at 1234 ("Trans-substantivity has no general justification that
should limit the legislative prerogative to enact substance-specific process law . . . . [L]egisla-
tures likely enjoy broad powers to legislate process law as they see fit.").




there is value in having distinct procedural rules for different substantive re-
gimes, agencies may be better positioned to write these rules.
In reality, the transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules exists "in name only."208
Courts have long applied the Federal Rules in different ways to different kinds
of cases, both formally and informally. Formally, for instance, the Court has is-
sued special rules that apply to habeas cases.2 09 Informally, managerial judging
by district judges entails tailoring discovery, motion practice, and protective or-
ders to the contours of each dispute.2 10 Scholars have also "plea[ded] for contex-
tualism," arguing that procedural rules be customized for different categories of
cases.2 11 As Bone has pointed out, the drafters of the Federal Rules valued
transsubstantivity only because of their storied belief that procedural rules could
be justified without referencing their impact on substantive outcomes - a belief
that has long since been repudiated.2 12 If transsubstantivity is just an aspirational
ideal, or even a mere fagade, then agency-led litigation rulemaking may be a way
to establish domain-specific procedural rules more consistently and transpar-
ently.
On net, the value of domain-specific decision making, polycentric problem-
solving, and coherence appears to outweigh the potential drawbacks. As dis-
cussed, court rulemaking is not immune from capture, and expertise-driven de-
cision making often transcends the theoretical benefits of transsubstantivity. But
whether one is superior is perhaps beside the point. In reality, litigation rule-
making can complement court rulemaking, as it has done so far.
208. Miller, supra note 184, 370.
209. See Resnik, supra note 201, at 526.
210. See id. at 527; see also Resnik, supra note 4, at 391-415.
211. Resnik, supra note 201, at 547; see also Miller, supra note 184, at 370-71 ("[C]onsideration
should be given to abandoning the transsubstantive principle requiring that the Federal Rules
be 'general' and applicable to all cases - a notion that supposedly is embedded in the Rules
Enabling Act .... That might encourage giving serious thought to putting cases on different
litigation tracks and devising different procedures that are deemed appropriate for the char-
acteristics of the cases posted to each track.").
212. See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OxiCA. L. REV.
319, 334 (2008) ("The fact that substantive policy is always a part of procedural justification
means that transsubstantivity as an independent value or ideal makes no sense at all."). Bone
argues that the optimal level of generality for procedural rules should be determined by bal-
ancing the costs and benefits of rules that are relatively more general or specific. See id.
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D. Institutional Implications
Although this Note describes only a few instances of agency-led litigation
rulemaking, these examples demonstrate an emerging trend in agency action.
Agency action that effectively amends the Federal Rules has accelerated in recent
years, not just by politically prominent agencies, like the NLRB, but also by less
salient bodies, like the CPSC. The rise of litigation rulemaking may be attribut-
able to an array of factors, including the current political context. That is, litiga-
tion rulemaking may be stepping in where one of the primary alternatives - leg-
islating procedural rules through statute -is stymied by political polarization
and gridlock.213 Transsubstantive amendments (such as changes to the FAA) of-
ten provoke political interests across the spectrum and are doomed from the
start.2 14 This can be the case with the Rules Committee process as well, although
amendments through the court rulemaking process continue to occur.215 Agen-
cies, on the other hand, are able to circumvent legislative logjam by taking ac-
tions grounded in their existing statutory mandates or in specific grants of au-
thority from Congress.
As the following Section explains, the legitimacy of litigation rulemaking is
bolstered by the judicial and congressional checks on agency action. These
checks and balances give rise to a unique dialectic between agencies and courts:
as agencies try to tell courts how to deal with cases, courts that disagree push
back through judicial decision making. The result of this interbranch dialogue is
a new procedural regime that has lasting effects on substantive legal outcomes.
1. Legitimacy
As described earlier, the legitimacy of litigation rulemaking is rooted in its
resemblance to court rulemaking. Just as courts' authority to promulgate the
Federal Rules comes from Congress via the Rules Enabling Act, agencies' au-
thority to act as litigation rulemakers comes from Congress via authorizing stat-
utes. These statutes provide the legal basis for agencies to promulgate rules
through notice-and-comment, engage in adjudications involving statutory in-
terpretation, and issue guidance and orders interpreting congressional man-
dates. Even agencies acting as litigation rulemakers remain bound by the re-
quirement that they not exceed their statutory authority. As a result, although
213. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 11-
17 (2014).
214. See Deacon, supra note 170, at 1032-33; see also supra note 199 and accompanying text.




litigation rulemaking may raise separation of powers questions, these questions
(and their answers) are no different than those associated with other forms of
agency action, including litigation gatekeeping.216
Nor is litigation rulemaking unchecked. At any time, Congress can constrain
an agency's authority through legislation. Judges, too, have long been charged
with holding agencies to their statutory limits - and have done so. When courts
have invalidated agencies' attempts to engage in litigation rulemaking, they have
typically done so by deciding that agencies exceeded the scope of their statutory
authority. For instance, the federal court preliminarily enjoining the CMS rule
against arbitration held that the agency had surpassed the authority it was
granted by Congress.217 The district judge found that the statutory language al-
lowing the agency to act for the purposes of "protecting [resident] health and
safety" was insufficient to permit the agency to limit nursing homes' use of ar-
bitration agreements.218 Like other agency action, litigation rulemaking is con-
strained by institutional checks.
The legitimacy of litigation rulemaking can vary by context. In certain cases,
Congress may expect that agencies will engage in litigation rulemaking to ad-
minister the law; while in others, Congress may intend the opposite. The ques-
tion of whether the agency is exceeding its authority depends on the substantive
statute. Take, for example, the CFPB, which, in the Dodd-Frank Act, was ex-
pressly tasked with promulgating a rule regulating arbitration.2 19 In that case, it
was clear that Congress intended the agency to consider litigation rulemaking as
216. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 193osRedux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 17-28,44 (2017); see also Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv.
2245, 2256 n.20 (2001). As Gillian Metzger has pointed out, only the most extreme anti-ad-
ministrativists believe that statutory delegations of authority to the executive branch should
be completely invalidated. So long as we have delegation, many features of the modern ad-
ministrative state necessarily follow, including deference to agency interpretations of statutes.
The question of what level of delegation should be allowed and what evidence of delegation
should be required before a court defers to agency action is beyond the scope of this Note.
Many of Metzger's arguments about the constitutionality of the administrative state are rele-
vant to separation-of-powers concerns about agency action generally, including litigation
rulemaking. See Metzger, supra, at 72, 87-95.
217. See Am. Health Care Ass'n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 934-38 (N.D. Miss. 2016).
218. Id. at 934. Note that this is the view of one district judge, subject to appellate review and
competing interpretations of the agency's authority to promulgate such a rule.
219. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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part of its project of protecting consumers.22 0 Of course, not all statutory author-
izations to engage in litigation rulemaking need be this express.22 1 The key point
is that agencies acting as litigation rulemakers are acting openly and as coordi-
nate branches of government. Litigation rulemaking does not involve imposing
unilateral restraints on the judiciary, but rather fashioning amendments to the
Federal Rules with the oversight of both Congress and the courts.
2. Agency-Court Dynamics
Litigation rulemaking presents a new frontier in the relationship between
agencies and courts. Even if litigation rulemaking were to slow down in a polit-
ical climate more averse to agency action, the examples outlined here are central
to understanding the institutional landscape today. As litigation rulemakers,
agencies are able not just to regulate third-party industry actors and individuals,
but courts as well. In telling judges how to approach litigation in their own
courtrooms, agencies impose additional constraints on judicial action. This type
of constraint is unlike others with which we are familiar: it is not the executive
refusing to enforce a judicial decree; nor is it Congress issuing a rule of decision
in a case222 or attempting to limit federal courts' jurisdiction through a statute.22
Instead, agencies are engaged in an interbranch dialogue about the appropriate
procedural regimes for different kinds of substantive claims. Agencies may be
directing courts about how to treat different kinds of claims, but agencies remain
220. Even those who believe that the Federal Rules regime is best kept transsubstantive have noted
that at times, Congress may want to permit domain-specific procedural rules. See, e.g., Car-
rington, supra note 205, at 2086 ("There may be times when Congress should respond to cries
for substance-specific procedural advantage. Clearly, procedure can affect substance and there
are constituencies that Congress might wish to favor who could benefit from a legislated
thumb on the procedural scales. If necessary to effect enforcement of a substantive right, Con-
gress may be justified in building into substantive enactments specific procedural provi-
sions.").
221. The question of how express statutory authorization for an agency action should be is a con-
text-specific inquiry, and one that has traditionally been left for courts to decide in each situ-
ation.
222. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-40 (1995) (explaining that Congress
cannot "prescribe rules of decision" to the courts, although it can "amend applicable law," and
discussing the relevant case law, including United States v. Klein, So U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872),
and Robertson v SeattleAudubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429 (1992)); see also Bank Markazi v. Peterson,
136 S. Ct. 1310, 1322-26 (2016) (reaffirming that Congress may not direct a rule of decision,
though it may amend substantive law in pending cases).
223. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738-39, 765-66, 776-78 (2008); see also Martin J.
Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the
Imperial Court, 25 CONST. COMM. 377 (2009) (explaining how Congress attempted to strip




constrained by courts' power to exercise judicial review of agency action. As a
result, agencies and courts end up working together to generate the procedural
regime for federal litigation in a novel way.
In acting as litigation rulemakers, agencies are not taking over judicial func-
tions, but rather stepping in to help administer substantive statutory mandates.
In fact, litigation rulemaking helps ensure that the rules of civil litigation do not
contradict or undermine substantive statutory goals articulated by Congress. For
instance, the NLRB has held that bans on class arbitration undermine the con-
gressional policy in favor of collective action embodied in the NLRA. By refor-
mulating the default rule on class arbitration in the labor context, the NLRB has
sought to align the procedural regime applied to these disputes with the sub-
stantive statutory policy set by Congress.
The example of FTC action on class action settlements demonstrates how
agencies and courts can work together through litigation rulemaking to write
the rules of civil litigation. By ordering claims administrators to report data on
the rates at which class members respond to notices and participate in class ac-
tions, the FTC can gather information that federal judges cannot- data that
judges will then be able to use when deciding whether to approve class settle-
ments. Courts, after all, are given substantial leeway to decide whether to ap-
prove class settlements. Armed with the FTC data, judges can more thoughtfully
determine whether a settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate," consistent
with Rule 23(e). For instance, judges could use this information to decide
whether a class notice is sufficient or whether to impose additional requirements
on parties before approving their settlement. While the FTC orders are, thus far,
focused on data-gathering and o not yet amount to an effective amendment of
the Federal Rules, this example demonstrates how agencies and courts can work
collaboratively and how litigation rulemaking can ensure a more informed ap-
plication of the Federal Rules in civil litigation.
The complementary nature of litigation rulemaking and court rulemaking is
exemplified by recent proposals for specialized procedural rules. In December
2016, the Administrative Conference of the United States224 recommended that
the federal court system adopt a special set of procedural rules for social security
224. The Administrative Conference of the United States is an independent federal agency that
researches and reports on ways to improve the workings of federal agencies, "including fair
and effective dispute resolution and wide public participation and efficiency in the rulemaking
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cases being reviewed in federal court.225 The Administrative Conference noted
that the Rules Enabling Act "does not require that procedural rules be trans-sub-
stantive" and that a range of factors -including the high volume of social secu-
rity litigation, the Federal Rules' failure to account for issues that arise during
judicial review of social security cases, and the costs of having different local rules
about social security cases across the country- suggest the need for specialized
rules.226 These proposals demonstrate that agencies are not only engaging in do-
main-specific rulemaking themselves, but they are also promoting these ideas to
the formal federal court rulemakers as well. The advent of litigation rulemaking
does not render court rulemaking irrelevant; nor does it preclude the ability of
court rulemaking to amend the Federal Rules in domain-specific ways. Instead,
the practices of administrative agencies inform the practices of the federal courts.
Court rulemaking goes hand-in-hand with litigation rulemaking.
The joint participation of courts and agencies can enhance the legitimacy of
the overall project. As it stands, court rulemaking is marked by concerns about
judicial politicking. These concerns are rooted in fears that the Rules Committee
seeks to influence substantive outcomes and in worries about lopsided public
participation unduly shaping the Rules. Even unwarranted worries about the
courts becoming more partisan can be enough to detract from judicial legiti-
macy.227 Offsetting this, agencies acting as litigation rulemakers can comple-
ment courts' endeavors and ensure that the judiciary is not the only actor respon-
sible for the federal procedural regime - nor the sole channel for public
participation. Litigation rulemaking multiplies avenues for public engagement
and prevents the courts from being the only ones who decide what litigation
should look like, enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the endeavor.
225. See Administrative Conference Recommendation 2016-3: Special Procedural Rules for Social Security
Litigation in District Court, ADMIN. CONF. OF U.S. (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.acus.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/Recommendation%2o2o16-3 .pdf [http://perma.cc/VX6Y-EDFA].
226. Id. at 1.
227. See Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power,
78 IND. L.J. 223, 306 (2003) (" [F]or separation of powers to work at any level requires insist-
ence on functional distinctions between different branches of government. When judicial ad-
vice moves beyond idiosyncratic efforts by individual judges to regular corporate commentary,
the judiciary loses more of its unique character. The lines between judicial and legislative de-
cisionmaking become increasingly blurred."); see also Burbank & Farhang, supra note 13, 16oo-
oi ("The rulemakers are not courts, and rulemaking under the Enabling Act is not an exercise
of judicial power under Article III. It is essentially a legislative activity, not a judicial activity,






To say that litigation rulemaking impacts only civil procedure would be to
tell an incomplete story. Agencies acting as litigation rulemakers set the rules for
how claims are brought to the courts, but the procedural rules affect what hap-
pens to those claims afterward as well. For instance, when an agency adjudica-
tion requires a federal court to hear a class action, it affects the decision on the
particular claim being heard, the nature of the relief awarded, and the shape of
the substantive legal regime that governs future claims like it. Likewise, when an
agency issues a rule that forbids a court from enforcing an arbitration clause, the
agency requires the court to hear a claim and to issue a decision-leading to the
development of substantive law.228 Thus, the procedural rules that structure the
course of a lawsuit mold the substantive law that emerges as well.
The impact of procedural rulemaking on substantive law is even more sig-
nificant today, given the rise of "regulation by litigation." Regulation by litigation
refers to how litigation shapes the law when direct regulation and legislation are
absent.229 Regulation by litigation has become increasingly common as political
gridlock thwarts legislative action and the ossification of rulemaking makes no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking less frequent.230 When actors attempt to develop
the law through litigation, the procedural regime that frames the litigation be-
comes even more important. For instance, individuals often bring class actions
to call for institutional change, whether in a prison system23 1 or at a work-
place.232 Changes in procedural rules about how courts treat these class actions
inevitably impact the substantive outcomes of these cases - that is, whether these
institutions end up changing their policies. As regulation by litigation becomes
228. This is not to say that every denial of a motion to compel arbitration is followed by a court
ruling on the merits. The point is simply that a court's refusal to send a case to arbitration
brings the case closer to being resolved on the merits by a court.
229. See, e.g., ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 1-2 (2009); Andrew P. Mor-
riss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How To Regulate, 29 HARv. ENv. L. REV. 179
(2005) (describing both the role of interest groups in forcing agencies to take action and the
role of agencies in bringing suits against private parties on the basis of novel interpretations
of the law).
230. See Engstrom, supra note 19, at 624; see generally MORRIss, supra note 229. Tobacco litigation
is a common example of this phenomenon. In the 1990s, state attorneys general sued major
cigarette manufacturers to recover Medicaid expenditures attributable to cigarette smoking.
The litigation, which spanned more than five years, took the place of ordinary legislation and
regulation of the tobacco industry. The litigation resulted in a settlement agreement hat es-
tablished rules governing the manufacturers' future behavior. See MORRIss, supra note 229, at
126.
231. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
232. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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more common, the importance of the procedural regime for substantive out-
comes will only grow. And the role of agencies in shaping these procedural re-
gimes will become increasingly relevant.
Litigation rulemaking can also push recalcitrant agencies or gridlocked leg-
islatures to act. For example, by exhorting courts not to allow auto and product
safety defects to be kept secret from oversight agencies, the NHTSA and CPSC
guidance helps agency officials collect the information necessary to decide what
substantive safety regulations might be needed in the future. This information
may motivate agencies (or Congress itself) to issue new substantive regulations.
In this way and others, agencies shape substantive legal regimes when they im-
plicitly amend the Federal Rules.
CONCLUSION
Civil procedure is no longer the same. Through notice-and-comment rule-
making, adjudication, guidance, and other actions, agencies acting as litigation
rulemakers are helping forge the federal procedural regime. It is difficult to over-
state the importance of the rules of civil litigation. These rules determine the
claims heard in court, the future of the law being litigated, and the relief available
to injured parties. Agencies are playing a critical role in shaping the rules at each
step.
As a result of these agency actions, the rules of civil procedure are being cal-
ibrated to different classes of cases. This is precisely the kind of legal landscape
that Robert Cover called for several decades ago:
It is by no means intuitively apparent hat the procedural needs of a com-
plex antitrust action, a simple automobile negligence case, a hard-fought
school integration suit, and an environmental class action to restrain the
building of a pipeline are sufficiently identical to be usefully encom-
passed in a single set of rules which makes virtually no distinctions
among such cases in terms of available process.23 3
Far from overstepping their bounds, agencies acting as litigation rulemakers
are serving a coordinating function between the courts and Congress, tailoring
procedural regimes to particular statutes and bringing area-specific expertise to
bear on the question of how litigation should be structured. And by helping en-
sure that courts function consistently with Congress's legislative goals, agencies
are bringing greater coherence to the legal regime.





Understanding litigation rulemaking sheds light on these interbranch dy-
namics and raises new questions about the legitimacy of agency action, the scope
of judicial review, and the role of Congress in overseeing agency-court relations.
As recent litigation reveals, these questions are far from abstract. Rather, the de-
bates reflect our convictions about the appropriate roles of agencies, courts, and
Congress in our system of self-government today.
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